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The traditional repertoire of techniques available to mediators is well-suited to as-
sisting negotiators in resolving their disputes where those negotiators are acting in
a manner approximating axiomatic rational behaviour. These techniques rely on
parties acting in this manner and effectively and accurately uncovering, processing
and calculating all the necessary information to make decisions in maximising their
utility. Behavioural-Economists have made great progress in illustrating that hu-
man beings do not follow these axioms when making economic-decisions and have
identified a number of ways in which we predictably deviate from that expectation
of behaviour. These deviations can have significant effects on negotiations and me-
diation. This disjuncture between expected and actual behaviour provides us with
an opportunity for development of additional techniques which can supplement our
existing mediation-tools where appropriate. In their practice, experienced mediators
have had to respond to these unexpected behaviours and have developed their own
strategies for doing so. This learned-knowledge represents a rich potential source
of strategic knowledge. Through a series of interviews, these lessons were distilled
and, encompassing a brief theoretical discussion, an overarching strategy for inter-
ventions in such circumstances was identified. This paper represents a modest at-
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1.1 Introduction and Research Area
The majority of academic writing concerned with mediator technique relies on cer-
tain expectations of how negotiators make economic decisions. Together these ex-
pected behaviours form what is known as the rational mode of decision-making.
Behavioural-Economics has illustrated that these expectations are very often inac-
curate and has established a number of theories which better illustrate how people
make those decisions1.
A disjuncture therefore exists. Mediation’s academic texts and the practice-orthodoxy
prescribes techniques designed as responses to a false ideal of behaviour. Noting
this problem, Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky2, issued the imperative to improve our un-
derstanding of choice-making behaviour and its relationship with negotiation and
mediation and to bridge the gap to these alternate models.
The benefit of doing so is clear; these new insights can allow mediators and ne-
gotiators to better understand their counterparts and clients as well as the impact of
their own behaviour. This can then grant them a more nuanced and flexible tool-kit
of interventions. In the years since Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky Bell’s challenge, further
progress has been made in analysing and predicting decision-making behaviour.
Though some work has been done in incorporating these lessons into mediation-
writing, it appears that room for further progress remains.3.
This paper represents a modest attempt to address this gap. The aim is to first de-
scribe the tenents of rational behaviour, then to establish how the traditional mediation-
model suits those expectations. Thereafter the paper aims to supplement this estab-
lished range of techniques by offering alternative options for mediators faced with
behaviour deviating from the rational model. To identify such options, it is neces-
sary to first identify and describe the behaviour requiring an amended approach.
Five well-established behavioural theories are therefore identified and their effect
within the mediation-context described or hypothesised. These theories were cho-
sen for the strength of evidence supporting them and for the extent to which they
impact on mediation. In each case, the paper notes the manner in which the partic-
ular behaviour violates the rationality expectations.
To establish whether these theories accurately portray negotiators’ behaviour,
interviews were conducted with 7 experienced South African mediators working
within the commercial and family contexts. The interviews were based on a series
1Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases”. In:
Science 185.4157 (1974), pp. 1124–1131.
2David E Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky. Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and pre-
scriptive interactions. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 19.
3Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases”.
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of fictional mediation-scenarios in which negotiators act in the “deviant” manners
described by these theories.
The behavioural theories are descriptive in nature and have been well-established
through thorough testing, it therefore unsurprising that the scenarios resonated with
those who regularly conduct mediations, even where the interviewees were un-
aware of the academic work describing these behaviours.
The main purpose of the interviews was to ascertain whether, having experi-
enced these “deviant” behaviours in practice, the interviewed mediators had devel-
oped their own repertoire of responses. Given their familiarity with the behaviour
described and their experience , the interviewees were indeed able to provide useful
and well-reasoned insights into possible responses to that behaviour.
The conclusions reached are discussed in detail below but it is submitted that
they provide an expanded range of interventions available to mediators in circum-
stances where standard mediation-techniques may prove unproductive. It was also
clear that the interviewee’ views on the appropriate nature and aims of these inter-
ventions held certain common threads. While their stated views differed as to the
appropriate level to which a mediator should influence the decisions of the negotia-
tors, it became clear that, in practice, they were each prepared to make interventions
which had such an impact. Cognisant of the need to both be and appear neutral,
while simultaneously empowering the negotiators to better pursue to their own in-
terests, the interventions proposed provide useful options for addressing the effects
of these deviations by enabling the parties to improve their decision-making on their
own volition.
1.2 Structure
To understand and evaluate the proposed techniques, we must understand the academic-
context in which these interviews took place. Chapter 2 begins by describing the
most prominent behavioural-assumptions which together form the rational model of
decision-making behaviour. Each of these are discussed in turn and later used to
explain how the five behavioural-theories chosen for discussion deviate from this
model.
Having established what this expected behaviour is, Section 2 of Chapter 2 de-
scribes the structure and strategies underpinning the dominant model of mediation
and how these strategies suit these behavioural assumptions.
Section 3 issues a word of caution, noting that although the paper seeks alterna-
tive and additional techniques, the traditional-model retains significant value and
should not be discarded as a means of structuring a mediation or, in many cases, as
an appropriate response to behaviour approximating rational behaviour. The tech-
niques prescribed here are intended to supplement rather than replace a more de-
fined and established set of techniques. This caution is repeated throughout the
paper.
Before discussing the deviations and their effects individually, Section 4 describes
the methodology used to extract the views of the interviewed mediators. This dis-
cussion describes the interview process and the research-strategy behind the inter-
views.
Methodology thus established and having illustrated the mediation-orthodoxy
and the behavioural assumptions underpinning it, we then discuss the areas in
which our standard mediation-techniques can be supplemented with reasoned re-
sponses to predictably-deviant behaviours.
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Before addressing the deviations individually, a more general discussion must
take place. Section 5 notes some common considerations relating to decision-making
biases and heuristics generally. These issues must be considered throughout the
discussion of the individual biases.
Section 6 discusses certain theories and issues which should shape our under-
standing and evaluation of the strategies proposed. The aim being to establish an
appropriate lens for analysing the interviewees’ suggestions.
Section 6.1 discusses the extent to which mediators should intervene to influ-
ence a matter. It comprises a brief consideration of the importance of the neutrality
and independence of mediators and a brief introduction to Susskind and Thaler’s
“Nudge” theory4 as an organising concept with which to make this assessment. This
discussion produced an overarching ideal against which the proposed strategies can
be compared and evaluated.
Section 6.2 considers two newer bodies of mediation-theory and which prescribe
methods and strategic emphasis which differs from traditional mediation models.
These theories are noted to place the techniques raised within the interviews within
an academic context, developed as they generally are from practice rather than from
theory and then to introduce a potential source of further techniques befitting our
theoretical ideal which can further supplement our standard tools.
Having established the context in which these interviews took place and hav-
ing identified a guiding theory for the discussion of the individual deviations, the
focus can shift to the individual deviations and the results emerging from the inter-
views.Chapter 3 deals with the individual biases in turn.
In respect of each bias the discussion follows the same pattern. First, the behavioural-
theory is stated and explained in its original context, thereby describing how people
make their decisions and the evidence supporting the theory.
To establish how this behaviour differs from our expectation of rational-behaviour,
it is then contrasted with the assumptions underpinning the rationality assumption
We then discuss the impact of the deviation within the mediation context specif-
ically.
To better illustrate the behaviour being addressed, it then briefly describes the
fictional scenarios discussed in the interviews Thereafter the paper addresses the
answer from the interviews. The first goal is simply to determine whether the be-
haviour described by these theories is often experienced within mediations.
Thereafter the theories and strategies emerging from the interviews are recounted
and analysed. This analysis builds on the theoretical discussion at Section 6 of Chap-
ter 2.
Having addressed the deviations individually, Part D concludes the paper with
some general remarks. First a final caution notes the difficulty of identifying the
effects of specific deviations in specific circumstances while retaining some room for
optimism by recognising our limited goal of providing options to supplement a well-
established set of techniques rather than of providing a rigid menu of interventions.
The paper concludes by identifying the common threads to the mediators’ views
and comparing them to the theoretical ideals established earlier, thereby presenting
a coherent theory to guide mediators’where negotiators acting deviate as described
here. Finally, potential sources of further insights are identified, particularly within
the Narrative and Transformative mediation theories.





Establishing an Analytical Context
2.1 Behavioural Assumptions Underpinning Traditional Me-
diation
Before evaluating the behavioural theories and seeking new techniques we must first
understand the classic mediation structure. These existing tools broadly operate on
a set of assumptions regarding the mediation’s participants.
These tenets were developed over a number of years through the work of sev-
eral historic economists and have unpderpinned much our modern economic-theory
and analysis. In general terms rational decision-making uses all available infor-
mation with the goal only of maximising personal utility, determined according to
established, identifiable and consistent preferences, while minimising all personal
costs. This concept comprises the four assumptions underpinning Von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s Expected-Utility-Principle1 being the assumptions of transitivity,
completeness, independence and continuity, which together service the ultimate goal of
maximising one’s self-interest2.
2.1.1 Transitivity
Transitivity refers to the expectation of consistency of choices, thus if X prefers A to B
and B to C, they must prefer A to C. People are therefore expected to be able to place
a number of outcomes or resolutions into a linear order of preference3. Consistency
of choices renders decision-making predictable and utility-enhancing. I
2.1.2 Completeness
Completeness demands an ability to make comparative decisions between all possi-
ble outcomes4. Any combination of A, B and C can therefore be compared with any
other and ranked in order of preference meaning that people can properly assess all
available options their expected-utility. In this manner, a range of choices and out-
comes can be compared and choices accurately made. This accuracy is necessarily
utility-enhancing.
1John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. “Theory of games and economic behavior”. In: Bull.
Amer. Math. Soc 51.7 (1945), pp. 498–504.
2Neva R. Goodwin et al. Microeconomics in Context. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Dec. 19, 2013.
ISBN: 0765638789, p. 146.
3Michel Regenwetter, Jason Dana, and Clintin P Davis-Stober. “Transitivity of preferences.” In:
Psychological Review 118.1 (2011), p. 42, p. 3.
4Herbert Gintis. The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences. Prince-
ton University Press, 2014, p. 5.
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2.1.3 Independence
The Independence axion requires the ability to make decisions without being influ-
enced by irrelevant considerations. A rational person would therefore evaluate a
particular proposal with reference only to information actually influencing their ex-
pected utility.5.
2.1.4 Continuity
The continuity is similar to transitivity in that it demands consistency in decision-
making. It assumes that a person attaches similar utility to similar proposals and
there should not be significant “spikes” or “troughs” in expected utility between
similar outcomes6. Thus a person who values 100 oranges at 10,0007 utility points
should, absent any particular cause, value 99 oranges at close to 10,000 points. When
people people rationally analyse potential outcomes, similar outcomes are therefore
valued similarly.
2.1.5 Self-Interest
This Neo-Classical model considers these axioms necessary deductions from the cen-
tral rationality axiom, that economic actors maximise their own utility. This assump-
tion underpins the entire analytical framework upon which classical economic the-
ory rests. By this view, utility is determined on depends solely on one’s personal
outcomes8. We should note that this theory does not represent reality and a more
subtle understanding of peoples’ preferences has since been developed to incorpo-
rate more benevolent interests9. In reality, in many cases, parties will be prepared to
sacrifice some of their own interests in pursuit of benefits to others, including even
the person with whom they are negotiating.
In sum, within the constraints of the knowledge available to them rational decision-
makers make the best possible decisions for their own ends. We will note below how
far people do actually deviate from this expectation and how economists have pro-
gressed in accounting for the failings of this assumption and the other assumptions.
2.2 The Traditional Model of Mediation
We must now assess how our established mediation techniques follow naturally
from these assumptions and are appropriate interventions where those assumptions
hold true.
The ordinary Law-and-Economics approach to mediation generally uses the fol-
lowing pattern10. Resolving a conflict relies on consensus being reached between the
parties. The precise ordering of the steps followed in pursuit thereof will vary but
the process will generally share several common features. The parties are encour-
aged to explore their and their opponents’ interests and uncover potential outcomes
5Gintis, The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences.
6H.R. Varian. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. W.W. Norton & Company, 2010.
ISBN: 9780393934243, p. 597.
7Of course this is an arbitrary figure and decision-makers do not actually make decisions in this
manner
8Goodwin et al., Microeconomics in Context, p. 146.
9Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober, “Transitivity of preferences.”, p. 3.
10Haksoo Ko. “On the Role of a Mediator: A Behavioural Law and Economics Perspective”. In: Asia
Pacific Law Review 17.sup1 (2009), pp. 195–204, p. 197.
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for the resolution of the matter11. The mediator then steers the participants, with
varying techniques and levels of influence, towards those outcomes which may be
acceptable to all parties, or the Zone-of-Possible-Agreement12. The mediator moves the
parties towards this zone by facilitating the trading of concessions and bargaining
towards mutually acceptable solutions.13.
To assist a negotiator to decide whether to accept an offer or concession is ac-
ceptable, mediators will act as agents of reality14 by encouraging them to properly
evaluate their options and rigorously test the assumptions or beliefs regarding their
prospects either within or outside the mediation. Commonly this process involves
encouraging participants to calculate their “best-alternative-to-a-negotiated-settlement’
(BATNA15). Essentially the parties are encouraged to predict the likely outcome of
a failure to reach a negotiated settlement. The mediator assists the negotiator to
consider the information necessary to make fully informed choices16.
In most (but not all) cases, their BATNA is the likely outcome of litigation17. Par-
ticipants must therefore consider the full meaning and consequence of proceeding
to trial and their prediction of their likelihood of success, expected size of the adju-
dicated award, the costs of obtaining that award including both financial and emo-
tional costz, the impact on their relationship with their opponent and the amount of
time it is likely to cost them. The total utility of this outcome is then compared with
the total utility of the outcom available through mediation. Once offers are created
which fall within the range of outcomes acceptable to both or all of the negotiators,
the ZOPA is reached and settlement can result18.
A rational actor confronted with an offer or considering how to construct their
own offer would be able to quantify the utility of their alternative outcome to set-
tlement, compare the two and make a choice which optimises their self-interested
utility or where designing an offer, reduces their own cost while maximising the
appeal to the other party19.
Mediators are often wary of accepting that their goal is to maximise preferences,
prefering to limit the scope of their intervention to the facilitation of the process of ne-
gotiation20. In reality though it appears that this goal does inform mediators’ strate-
gies. 21. This is unsurprising as maximising parties’ preferences necessarily increases
the likelihood of reaching settlement and leaving the parties viewing the process as
helpful and the mediator effective and worth the cost of their services. Therefore,
where possible, mediators will try and reach a utility-maximising outcome, using
the techniques described above.
11Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky, Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions, p. 19.
12Negotiation Experts. The Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). URL: https://www.negotiations.
com/articles/zopa/ (visited on 04/25/2017).
13Ibid.
14Susan S Silbey and Sally E Merry. “Mediator settlement strategies”. In: Law & Policy 8.1 (1986),
pp. 7–32.
15Robert Benjamin. The Natural History of Negotiation Mediation: The Evolution of Negotiative Be-
haviours, Rituals, and Approaches. June 2012. URL: https : / / www . mediate . com / articles /
NaturalHistory.cfm (visited on 04/25/2017).
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Negotiation Experts, The Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).
19Laurence Boulle. “Predictable irrationality in mediation: Insights from behavioural economics”.
In: Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal (2013), pp. 4-5.
20Leonard L Riskin. “Understanding mediators’ orientations, strategies, and techniques: A grid for
the perplexed”. In: Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (1996), p. 7.
21During the interviews, each of those mediators interviewed referred to some degree of desire and
concerted action to at the very least determine whether settlement is possible.
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The classic mediation-techniques aim at achieving or approximating such an out-
come22. The imperative to fully explore the interests underpinning the participants’
decisions and the options available to satisfy those interests are aimed at achieving
the most mutually-desirable outcome possible. The parties are therefore encour-
aged to seek a wide range of utility-maximising outcomes and to use their rational
decision-making power to find the best outcomes for themselves. Their ability to do
so depends on the participants matching or approximating the behavioural assump-
tions underpinning the rational behavioural model.
2.3 Residual Value of the Existing Model
That the classic mediation-techniques are predicated on an expectation of informed,
consistent and coherent decision-making is both sensible and borne out by the con-
sistent responses of those interviewed for this paper. There is also no doubt therefore
that these techniques retain significant value. As Birke and Fox highlight23, a focus
on these deviations not an indictment on the rationality-model. That model acts as
a “compass” towards desirable outcomes. As Boulle notes, the mediation process
can be likened to a market system wherein rational decision-makers produce effi-
cient outcomes through the bargaining process. Rational actors therefore generally
produce efficient outcomes24. Thus the concept of rationality is both descriptive and
aspirational. we are generally here aiming to facilitate this kind of negotiation.
This view is borne out by the interviewee’s commonly recommended response to
participants acting in unexpected or “irrational” manners, it is important to try and
place them in a more rational state of analysis and communication. This indicates
that rational, calculated behaviour is desirable in this context and is, to some degree
at least, achievable through the correct choice of technique and that where the parties
are approximating the rational axioms, the classic techniques are very useful.This is
unsurprising. Mediators who can rely on parties fully and accurately exploring,
understanding and evaluating their interests and being capable of making coherent
decisions are more predictable and the ebb-and-flow of concessions and negotiation
can more easily be anticipated and constructively guided25.
It is further submitted that the behavioural axioms may also serve a role as pre-
dictive tools where the “deviant” behaviours are perhaps more difficult to recognise
and predict. Thus, if we cannot predict how a person is going to act, a mediator may
be best served by acting under the assumption of a rational mind-set26.
We must therefore be clear that this paper seeks only to build on existing strate-
gies, rather than replace them. To reiterate therefore, we are aiming only to de-
termine whether mediators recognise particular patterns of “deviation” from these
assumptions and if so, to distil the lessons learned by mediators in responding to
these deviations so as to expand the range of tools available in response to these
deviant behaviours.
22See, for example, Gibsons’s (1994) invocation to “act rationally” and encourage rational solutions
in response to unexpected or unpredictable behaviour on the part of participants and indeed mediators
themselves (cf. Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky, pp. 166-168)
23Richard Birke. “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”. In: J. Disp. Resol. (2000),
p. 309.
24Boulle, “Predictable irrationality in mediation: Insights from behavioural economics”.
25Goodwin et al., Microeconomics in Context.
26Indeed, the majority of economic analysis relies on these assumptions for this reason, see Goodwin
et al.
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2.4 The Interview Process
Unfortunately it appears that little academic work has been aimed at incorporating
these behavioural findings into mediation strategies27. As these theories describe
how people actually behave, it was hoped that experienced mediators would recog-
nise behavioural patterns approximating these theoretical behaviours, even if they
were unaware of the academic work describing them. If this were the case, it was
hoped that through practice, they would have developed their own responses.
To determine whether this was so, a number of interviews were conducted with
experienced mediators with varying specialisations. The interview process con-
sisted of seven interviews, which averaged around 90 minutes per person. The inter-
viewees were given factual scenarios presenting participants acting in line with each
of the deviations described below. The interviewees were given the choice to deal
with family or commercial disputes and separate scenarios were created for eeither
context.
The interviews were semi-structured in that a standard list of questions was used
in reference to each scenario but discussion was allowed to flow where necessary
and helpful, with follow-up questions used in order to develop and pursue issues
raised by the interviewee. The questions used were deliberately open-ended since,
as Yin28 contends, open-ended questions encourage participants to use their own
words and not that of the recorder.
These interviews were qualitative in approach since they aimed at uncovering
the lived experiences of mediators rather than making statistical enquiries. Ed-
mondson and McManus29 states that the less is known about a phenomenon the
more likely exploratory-qualitative research will prove fruitful. The interviews aimed
to generate theory, rather than test theory and were therefore intended to be more
in-depth, nuanced and flexible than a quantitative approach would have allowed.
Though traditional mediation-practice is well described and analysed in the litera-
ture, little investigative research has been done into the particular strategies medi-
ators have developed as responses to common “irrational” behaviours and for this
reason, a more in-depth interview process was necessary.
The interviews were limited in number and the interviewees therefore represent
a small sample size. In qualitative research, the sample size may be smaller than that
found in quantitative research30. This paper does not seek statistical confirmation of
a theory but rather a sufficiently extensive canvassing of the views of those likely
to have relevant views to give. Thus, the writer seeks saturation31, in the sense of
having a sufficiently wide range of interviewees such that all possible and relevant
views and opinions are covered by the field of interviewees.
Although desirable complete saturation is impossible to achieve, however, cer-
tain factors present here limit the number of interviewees necessary for a sufficient
approximation thereof. Firstly, the field of experienced mediators in South Africa
is reasonably small. Secondly, that the interviews are conducted with experts in
the field suggests that a wider knowledge of possible strategies and interventions
27Ko, “On the Role of a Mediator: A Behavioural Law and Economics Perspective”.
28Robert K Yin. Qualitative research from start to finish. Guilford Publications, 2015.
29Amy C Edmondson and Stacy E McManus. “Methodological fit in management field research”.
In: Academy of management review 32.4 (2007), pp. 1246–1264.
30Mark Mason. “Sample size and saturation in PhD studies using qualitative interviews”. In: Forum
qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: qualitative social research. Vol. 11. 3. 2010.
31Thomas Groenewald. “A phenomenological research design illustrated”. In: International journal
of qualitative methods 3.1 (2004), pp. 42–55.
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for mediators will be held amongst the relatively small grouping of interviewees32.
Though there are some distinctions between the mediators interviewed, their prac-
tical training is largely sourced from similar materials and institutions33. This was
borne out in the similarities between the methods generally proposed during the
interviews.
2.5 General Considerations Relating to the Deviations
Despite the aforementioned desirability of the rational model’s predictions and its
residual value as a tool for prediction and analysis, it has significant descriptive limi-
tations. The assumptions referred to above do not adequately predict or describe our
actual economic behaviour34. Rational-economics theorists had more many years
noted that “errors” occur but had consistently concluded that they were not pre-
dictable35. In later years, behavioural-economists and psychologists have shifted
this belief, finding that in many cases these ‘errors’ took on a very consistent form
and have as a result, noted the need for interdisciplinary research to make these
observations useful36.
While a detailed discussion of five specific deviations follows below, we should
first note a few characteristics which they share as they may inform our general
approach to dealing with the deviations.
An important aspect to remember is that when we “deviate” from the rational
expectation of behaviour, we do not do so consciously. They are automatic, sub-
conscious processes which are difficult to subvert. Birke and Fox’s analogy to opti-
cal illusions is helpful here in that it illustrates that although our brain responds to
stimuli or information in something of a distorted manner, we are unaware that it is
doing so37. As a result, merely pointing out that our brains are acting in this way is
often insufficient to prevent its effects.
We should also take heed of Kahnemann and Tversky’s reminder that these de-
viations do not always act to hinder settlement38. In many cases, they may lead
to settlement where a rational actor would not settle. The extent to which medi-
ator should intervene in such circumstances will vary according to the mediator’s
understanding of their role.
2.6 Establishing an Analytical Framework
Before analysing consider the interviewee’s proposals,a framework for that analysis
must be established.
32J Lewis Ritchie and J Lewis. “J. & Elam, G.(2003). Designing and selecting samples”. In: Qualitative
research practice. A guide for social science students and researchers (), pp. 77–108.
33Ibid.
34Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”. In: Prefer-
ence, Belief, and Similarity (1992), p. 729, p. 50.
35Ibid., p. 49.
36Ibid.
37Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”.
38Riskin, “Understanding mediators’ orientations, strategies, and techniques: A grid for the per-
plexed”, p. 746.
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2.6.1 Mediator Neutrality and Intervention - What is a Nudge too Far?
Neutrality, impartiality, and independence are commonly considered fundamental
elements of mediation and are included in many definitions of mediation, includ-
ing that in the preamble to the 2005 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
define the process as one in which, “an impartial third party facilitates communica-
tion and negotiation and promotes voluntary decision-making by the parties to the
dispute39.” Many academic definitions also include reference to these concepts40.
Despite this, there is a growing academic belief that these terms do not actually
describe the reality of mediation41 and in many cases are not necessarily desirable
attributes of mediator behaviour42. This acknowledgement has taken hold within
academic writing but nonetheless appears, at least theoretically, to remain as a foun-
dational element of the process in the minds of mediators43.
This overarching concept appears to include four elements44:
1. A lack of conflict of interest
2. Process-equality wherein each party is treated equally
3. Outcome-neutrality, meaning that the mediator’s preferences as to the outcome
of the negotiation are irrelevant
4. Self-determination for the parties wherein the parties themselves decide the
outcome, rather than the mediator
The rationale underpinning these ideals, is to encourage participants to trust in
the process, accept its outcomes, exercise their self-determination and accept the
legitimacy of the process. Where a participant feels that they are not being treated
fairly, their communication with the mediator and willingness to engage with the
process is likely to suffer. That this rationale relates to the views of the participants
indicates that the appearance of neutrality is equally important. Thus, mediators
must ensure that they not only are neutral but also that they appear to be so45.
Douglas’ work questions the binarymanner in which we view mediators as ei-
ther neutral or non-neutral46. Freed from this dichotomy, she offers an alternative
conception of what mediators really view their obligations in respect of neutral-
ity. Her key finding is that mediators emphasise their role in empowering the self-
determination of their negotiators47. This roles involves ensuring that both or all
parties involved are able to make decisions giving effec to their own interests. Thus,
the actions of the mediator must give effect to the interests and informed views of
the participants rather than their own.
39American Arbitration Association. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators. Sept. 2005. URL:
https : / / www . americanbar . org / content / dam / aba / migrated / dispute / documents / model _
standards_conduct_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf (visited on 01/31/2018).
40Carrie Menkel-Meadow et al. Dispute resolution: beyond the adversarial model. Wolters Kluwer Law
& Business, 2011, p. 95.
41Orna Cohen, Naomi Dattner, and Ahron Luxenburg. “The limits of the mediator’s neutrality”. In:
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 16.4 (1999), pp. 341–348.
42Linda Mulcahy. “The possibilities and desirability of mediator neutrality-towards an ethic of par-
tiality?” In: Social & Legal Studies 10.4 (2001), pp. 505–527.
43Susan Douglas. “Neutrality in mediation: a study of mediator perceptions”. In: Queensland U.
Tech. L. & Just. J. 8 (2008), p. 139, p. 2.
44Carol Izumi. “Implicit bias and the illusion of mediator neutrality”. In: Wash. UJL & Pol’y 34
(2010), p. 71, pp. 74-75.
45Hin Hung. “Neutrality and impartiality in mediation”. In: ADR Bulletin 5.3 (2002), p. 7.
46Douglas, “Neutrality in mediation: a study of mediator perceptions”, p. 140.
47Ibid., pp. 150-151.
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A further insight from her work48 and the work of a number of others49 is that
in cases where a power-imbalance exists between parties, an entirely equal process
can lead to an inequality of outcome and opportunity to affect the negotiaton. In
addition to these academic voices, it appears that the practical attitude of mediators
agrees that some degree of assistance is justified in certain circumstances to ensure a
fair overall process.
This approach echoes Birke’s critique of the popular dichotomy50 assumed be-
tween facilitative and evaluative mediators, a divide51 which provides a useful but
probably incomplete description of a spectrum of approaches one can take on this
issue. Facilitative-mediators only provide the platform and process for the parties
to communicate and explore their interests. Evaluative-mediators play a deeper role
in that they evaluate and analyse the content of the proposals made by each side.
Birke argues that this distinction between evaluative and facilitative-mediation has
perhaps drawn too much attention in the literature. They are useful terms for differ-
entiating techniques but the absolute distinction drawn between the two approaches
does not resonate with reality. Very few mediators operate solely in one or the other
manner and will intervene in appropriate circumstances, including often where a
power-imbalance exists.
We must therefore ask whether the behaviours we are considering here justify
similar interventions. The decision-making heuristic or rationality-shortfall mani-
fests as an inability to fully and correctly appraise and analyse one’s own interest or
to appraise one’s strategic position. Where this is the case, it is submitted that inter-
ventions aimed at addressing this inability are justified on similar grounds to those
justifying interventions in the case of negotiating power imbalances. In a sense, these
failings may themselves be considered a source of power-imbalance.
Ko’s brief introduction of her new-evaluative approach suggests a similar conclu-
sion. Without prescribing particular techniques or approaches, she argues that me-
diators should intervene to assist negotiators whose cognitive-abilities are limited
by these biases. Though she does not justify this argument on a power-imbalance
basis, the logic is similar. Where a party is unable to give best-effect to their own
interests through a disadvantage of knowledge, skill or experience, a mediator is
justified in intervening to correct that shortcoming52.
If an intervention is justified, it must be crafted in the light of the need to retain
fairness and the appearance of neutrality. Thus, the interventions aimed at address-
ing these cognitive errors should be limited to encouraging the parties to properly
consider their own interests and the risks they face rather than promotoing the me-
diator’s preferred outcome.
Susskind and Thaler’s Nudge Theory presents a potential outline for the proper
limits ofintervention. Their work describes a libertarian-paternalistic model wherein
the choice-making architecture of a decision is manipulated to encourage a party to
make the decision which ultimately gives effect to their interests53. This approach is
libertarian in that it promotes the pursuit of self-determination but it is paternalistic
48Douglas, “Neutrality in mediation: a study of mediator perceptions”, pp. 147-148.
49Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin. “Practice and paradox: Deconstructing neutrality in mediation”. In:
Law & Social Inquiry 16.1 (1991), pp. 35–62, p. 35.
50Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”, p. 309.
51See Zena Zumeta. “Styles of mediation: Facilitative, evaluative, and transformative mediation”.
In: National Association for Community Mediation Newsletter (2000).
52Ko, “On the Role of a Mediator: A Behavioural Law and Economics Perspective”.
53Daniel Watkins. “A nudge to mediate: How adjustments in choice architecture can lead to better
dispute resolution decisions”. In: Am. J. Mediation 4 (2010), p. 19.
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in that the information surrounding the decision is manipulated to encourage a par-
ticular choice. Thus, the manipulator (in our case the mediator) is not altering the
preferences but encourages a more effective pursuit of these preferences54.
Based on our earlier discussion, it appears that our approach mirrors this con-
ception of intervention in that the mediator should limit their interventions to those
assisting the negotiator to access and use the information governing their decisions.
The mediator should therefore should not pursue a particular outcome but rather
encourage parties to consider all potential outcomes and to accurately pursue that
result best suiting their interests.
2.6.2 Alternative Theories of Mediation – Opportunities for Insight
Having attempted an explanation of the appropriate level and aims of mediator-
intervention in response to the behaviour discussed in this paper, it is useful to con-
sider the lessons of two newer schools of mediation theory. These theories are chosen
because their focus goes beyond the types of interventions forming the traditional
structure of a mediation. A complete study of these two relatively well-developed
fields of mediation theory is not necessary but a brief introduction increases our un-
derstanding of the issues facing us.
By understanding the aims underpinning these theories, particularly in relation
to better equipping people to make decisions in a manner which best promotes their
own interests, we can place the techniques proposed in the interviews within an
academic context and compare them to those theories’ strategies. It also potentially
allows us to supplement the nterviewee’s proposals and determine whether they
provide further suitable responses falling within the bounds we have prescribed for
desirable interventions.
Transformative Mediation
Bush and Folger’s work55 provides an interesting lens for viewing the strategies
proposed through these interviews. They contrast two models of mediation. The
Problem-Solving model largely accords with the traditional-model referred to through-
out this paper. It focusses on the issues facing the parties and on uncovering mutually-
acceptable solutions to address each party’s interests. The approach is therefore
outcome-focussed. This is contrasted with their Transformative-model’s focus on con-
fronting the relational elements causing or exacerbating a dispute and on the parties’
ability to engage with the mediation to best give effect to their desires56.
They view mediation as capable of providing certain shifts allowing negotiators
to actively engage in the matter in a problem-solving manner. Crucially, it is empha-
sised that in both cases, the shifts have to be driven by the negotiators themselves,
the mediator must only provide the environment and guidance allowing this to oc-
cur57.
These shifts include empowerment and recognition shifts58. The former describes
the transformation of a person who does not feel equipped to advocate their views
and negotiate towards their desires to a place where they feel they can do so.
54Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, pp. 17-39.
55Robert A Baruch Bush and Joseph P Folger. The promise of mediation: The transformative approach to
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A recognition-shift describes a negotiator becoming able to better empathise with
their counterparts negotiators and to communicate this improved recognition and
empathy. This transformation can encourage parties to feel that their w-ellbeing is
being valued within the process and it is argued that this rendesr them able to bypass
their anger, frustration or uncertainty regarding the negotiation and engage with the
process in a more open and constructive manner59.
This approach involves three major forms of intervention60:
1. A micro-focus on the manner in which the parties communicate and its effect
on the conflict
2. Encouraging negotiators towards self-led analysis as opposed to active guid-
ance
3. Framing and reframing arguments to encourage recognition of the other par-
ties’ views and arguments
They argue that these transformative-techniques are so radically different to the
problem-solving methods that a mediator cannot pick and choose between the broader
strategies and must wholly embrace one set of interventions or the other61.
Narrative Mediation
The techniques proposed by the Narrative-Mediators62 were raised by several inter-
viewees as a potentially useful means of addressing the behaviour we are consider-
ing here. A full exploration of this field is neither possible nor necessary here but a
brief introduction is of benefit.
Like Transformative-Mediation, Narrative-Mediation focusses on addressing conflict
itself rather than pursuing resolutive outcomes. The theory posits that we view
conflicts and people in terms of a narrative rather than as a crystalised entity. This
narrativecreates and informs a person’s understanding of those people or events63.
The theory recognises that the narratives are generated from one’s own perspective
and are based on subjective moral-norms and access to one’s own available facts.
Two people involved in a dispute will therefore often have a wildly varied different
understandings of a conflict. Although we view people and events in terms as a
narrative, that narrative can be shaped by what Winslade and Monk describe as
totalising descriptions64 wherein people develop complex narratives where events
are continually and innacurately understood in a particular narrow light. Thefore an
adulterous spouse’s actions may always thereafter be interpreted as untrustworthy.
The techniques based on this approach emphasise the importance of building
trust between the mediator and participant, to facilitate full and honest disclosure65,
separating the content of the dispute from the identity of those involved66, creating
awareness of the ongoing story of the conflict, mindful of how attitudes have shifted
as time has passed , acknowledging the impact of differing cultural-norms on the
59Bush and Folger, The promise of mediation: The transformative approach to conflict.
60Ibid.
61Ibid., p. 65.
62John Winslade and Gerald D Monk. Practicing narrative mediation: Loosening the grip of conflict. John





2.6. Establishing an Analytical Framework 15
creation of these narratives of the conflict and finally emphasising the development
and discussion of solution-based narratives wherein the parties are encouraged to
imagine or design a positive continuation of the narrative.
We must remember these insights when analysing the interviews and determine




The Deviations and Suggested
Responses
3.1 Introduction
We must now consider the five deviations themselves. In respect of each deviation,
the paper will describe the theory its supporting evidence, identify how it ”deviates”
from axiomatic rational behaviour and assess its impact on mediation. Finally, the
strategies and techniques emerging from the interviews are discussed and assessed
in respect of each individual deviation.
Although the strategies emerged in deviation-specific contexts, in many cases
they form part of a broader strategy which is uTseful in respect of other deviations.
for example. Techniques aimed at encouraging full-consideration of facts and set-
tlement options will be of use where negotiators’ focus is too narrow as a product
of any of the deviations but also where someone generaly fails to fully canvas their
own interests and options.
3.2 Relative Distortion and Substitute Questions
3.2.1 Relative Distortion
What is Relative Distortion?
To begin we consider two devations which operate in tandem within the mediation
context. The first, Dan Ariely’s choice-relativity-theory argues that humans make de-
cisions by comparisons1, rather than by ascribing an absolute utility to a particular
item. Thus, we determine value relative to other comparable items or options, avail-
able to us or not.
Ariely argues that this is an instinctive process. We do not decide to make evalu-
ations in this manner, we just do2. The value of doing so is that it allows us to remain
within what Simon terms our bounded-rationality, our finite limit of computational-
capacity3. Thus, instead of making a judgement on every element of an item and
then aggregating the results to “rate” the item, we save computational-energy by
“ranking” it relative to other items. Simon argues that without doing so, we would
struggle to make complicated choices at all.
1D. Ariely. Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our
Decisions. HarperCollins, 2010. ISBN: 9780061353246, p. 2.
2Ibid., p. 7.
3Herbert A Simon. “A behavioral model of rational choice”. In: The quarterly journal of economics
69.1 (1955), pp. 99–118, pp. 99-118.
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He argues further that these comparisons can only be made between comparable
items4. Thus, we may clearly prefer Coca-Cola to Fanta but we may not compare a
coca-cola to owning a new pen. Again, this is a function of our brain’s desire to
minimise the computational-energy required to make this analysis.
Ariely’s Economist-Magazine advert exampl elegantly illustrates this concept.
It involves an advert for three subscription-options;the print edition only for $125,
online-only for $59 and a combination of both also for $125. When he presented
these options to his 100-member MBA class, 84 chose option 3 while 16 chose option
2. When he removed option 1 from the equation with another class, 68 chose option
2 and 32 chose option 3. Since no one chose the print-only option, its removal should
not have affected the second round of testing, since the choice in the first round was
really only between options 2 and 3 anyway.
Ariely argues that this choice-structure was designed to manipulate potential
subscribers using an understanding that people do not value items in absolute terms
but instead value them by comparison with other similar items. Thus, in providing
the print-and-online edition at the same price as the print-only edition, the print-
and-online edition became attractive as it was clearly superior to the print-only op-
tion. The key is that the print-only and print-and-online options were very easily
comparable. The print-and-online option is clearly superior to the print-only op-
tion. Because that option has “won” this comparison, it is imbued with additional
strength in the comparison with the online-only subscription which, because of its
lower price, is really the alternative facing the potential subscribers5.
Though this shift is irrational, it is not unpredictable. To reiterate, Ariely finds
that the mind virtually always appraises things through comparison and where
there are multiple options to consider, the mind ranks options which are similar
to one another. Thus, if one option presented is even slightly more attractive than
another similar option, its absolute value increases simply by virtue of the mind hav-
ing made the comparison. Similarly, an option can be undervalued relative to other
options because it fails on a similar comparison6.
Nature of the Deviation
The independence-tenet is violated. The print-only option is irrelevant to the print-
and-online and online-only election but the experiment’s results indicate a signifi-
cant effect. Thus, an irrelevant, utility-neutral factor (its comparison with an irrele-
vant alternative,) affects the appraisal of another option.
It also violates the completeness-axiom since it shows that decision makers are
not capable of assessing all potential outcomes, we can only do so by comparing
them to comparable items.
Finally, the continuity-axiom is violated as our preferences between two similar
items may significantly vary by virtue of a slight dissimilarity. Thus, our preferences
are not smooth and predictable in the axiomatic sense.
Mediation and Comparison
The discussion of orthodox mediation-technique above illustrates how fundamental
comparison is to the evaluation of options within mediation. In choosing to accept
4Anuj K Shah and Daniel M Oppenheimer. “Heuristics made easy: An effort-reduction frame-
work.” In: Psychological bulletin 134.2 (2008), p. 207.
5Ariely, Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Deci-
sions, pp. 4-6.
6Ibid.
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a proposal or not, they are compared to each other and to their BATNA. Thus, a
negotiator’s decisions within a mediation necessarily rely on comparison.
3.2.2 Substitute Questions
Substitute Question Effect
Having established that we appraise options by means of comparison, we must also
consider how that comparison is made. When we appraise an item or offer which
has diverse effects on our varied interests, our brain’s need to remain within its
bounded-rationality forces it to narrow its focus. It does so by using a substitute-
question through which the total value of a complex-proposal is determined by its
performance in respect of a particular consideration. Boulle7 illustrates this concept
through the extreme example of a consumer purchasing electronics based on their
colour.
This process is an unconscious one8. The person acting in this manner has not
chosen a determinative question but nonetheless makes the decision on that basis.
In this manner, the cognitive-difficulties of comparison between complex proposals
are reduced.
Nature of Deviation
In addition to the deviations already caused by the choice-relativity effect, the substitute-
question effect distances the participants’ behaviour even further from the rational-
expectation by narrowing their calculation to a particular determinative issue. This
exacerbates the violation of the axioms already resulting from the comparative-effect.
3.2.3 Combined Effect in the Mediation Context
When operating together, the total-effect can be explained as follows; when a pro-
posal is made within a mediation, its value is assessed through comparison to the
person’s BATNA or to alternate proposals or outcomes either arising within the con-
text of the mediation or experienced or attained by others within the knowledge of
the participant. In making this comparison, the evaluator will very often subcon-
sciously fixate on a particular sub-issue and compare the two offers solely or dispro-
portionately on this consideration. Proposals which succeed or fail on this narrow
consideration will be overvalued or undervalued, simply by succeeding or failing.
In many cases, the use of such heuristics is beneficial. Shah and Oppenheimer9
have described them as a means of reducing the computational ffort of decision-
making. Simon’s Bounded Rationality theory10 recognises our limits in this regards
and notes that, decision-making sometimes be impossible without the use of these
heuristics. Therefor where a matter is too complex or where narrow issue does re-
quire particular scrutiny, this thinking may be useful. It is simple and allows a party
certainty in their negotiation
Generally though, this will lead to a miscalculation of the true value of a particu-
lar proposal. We must be clear in using the term “value” here. We do not mean that
7Boulle, “Predictable irrationality in mediation: Insights from behavioural economics”, p. 9.
8Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick. “Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in
intuitive judgment”. In: Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment 49 (2002), p. 81, pp.
49-81.
9Shah and Oppenheimer, “Heuristics made easy: An effort-reduction framework.”
10Simon, “A behavioral model of rational choice”.
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the person is not properly deciding what their interests are; instead we mean that
the person is not properly calculating the total effect of a proposal on those interests,
whatever those interests may be. These biases can together have this effect in one of
two senses.
In the more simple sense, the focus on a narrow issue as a determinate of the
total value of a proposition will mean that the utility of the other aspects of the
proposal will not properly be considered. Thus, the party will simply not be able
to properly ascertain what it is that they want nor appraise a proposition with full
consideration of their own complex interests. this narrow focus will also inhibit
the brainstorming processes which are so integral to the solution-seeking phase of
mediation. Focussing on a particular issue will limit the capacity to develop creative
solutions. For ease of reference we shall refer to this effect as the narrowing effect.
A negotiator facing someone operating in this mode will have their prospects of
successfully reaching settlement stand or fall on their ability to satisfy that person
on that particular issue. Thus, if they can make the required concession at acceptable
cost to themselves, they can hope to extract significant benefit from a negotiator who
is only focussed on that narrow issue.
The other more complex effect operates like the Economist-advert above. When
considering one or more settlement-proposal, a party’s evaluation of that proposal
may be distorted by its comparative success or failure on the substitute-question
relative to another proposal, one’s BATNA or anecdotal expectations of one’s likely
results from a negotiation. This means that because a particular proposal fails on this
one issue, relative to this comparator outcome, its value relative to other proposals
which cannot be compared along this substitute-question test will suffer dispropor-
tionately. We shall refer to this effect as the relative-distortion effect.
An example is useful to illustrate the point. A and B are married but intend to
divorce. A’s sister has recently been divorced and received interim-maintenance in
excess of the amount proposed in B’s consent-papers. A has been advised by their at-
torneys that in the event of the divorce being adjudicated in court, they are unlikely
to receive any award of interim-maintenance at all but would instead more likely
receive a lump-sum payment or a distribution of a greater value of assets . A’s at-
torneys advise that even with the lower interim-maintenance offer, the total value of
B’s proposal is more than reasonable. Nonetheless A is focussed on the very narrow
issue of maintenance and because B’s offer fails relative to A’s sister’s experience
on that issue, its absolute value relative to the BATNA falls. The BATNA cannot
be compared on this same question because of the advice that the court prefers al-
ternative methods. Thus, a distorted valuation of the consent-paper proposal will
mean that the BATNA comparison cannot properly be made and A will be unable to
properly assess their own prospects and interests.
3.2.4 The Interviews
The scenarios informing the interviews were based on a similar decision-making
structure. In both cases a decision-maker was confronted with a complex choice
between two potential outcomes and the implicit option of pursuing their BATNA.
In both cases, in the face of multifaceted options, they made their decision based on
a single criterion without properly considering the full range of relevant factors.
In both cases, the fact that the one offer succeeded in respect of this narrow crite-
ria meant that the offer, as a whole, took on an inflated value when compared with
another potential outcome or the person’s BATNA.
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The commercial scenario involved the CEO of a clothing-manufacturer choosing
whether or not to continue a long-standing relationship with a logistics-company
(‘Clark’s’) who, responding to labour unrest and increased costs, were being forced
to increase their transport price in order to remain viable. The alternative was to
divert their logistics needs to another company (‘Buchanan’s’), who had previously
tendered a lower price than the new proposed price but who, for various reasons,
would offer an inferior service for the company’s needs. The decision-maker fixated
on price and did not adequately consider the other factors and as a result, overval-
ued the Buchanan’s offer relative to Clarke’s new proposal.
The divorce-scenario describes a spouse who is choosing between two complex
offers of settlement for their divorce. As in the commercial scenario, the decision was
made based on which of the two offers included the better motor vehicle. Again,
the spouse’s focus was very narrow in the face of a complex decision and ignored
certain crucial issues relevant to this decision. The offer which included the better
vehicle was overvalued relative other potential outcomes, including litigation or a
renegotiation of the offers.
The interviewees were then asked whether they recognised this pattern of be-
haviour from their practice and then how they would respond to the person making
their decisions in this manner with the discussion largely focussing on techniques




The interviewees recognised the tendency of participants in their mediations to focus
narrowly on a particular issue and of having that narrow issue disproportionately
determinating their attitude to the outcome as a whole. Each interviewee recognised
this tendency but the explanations offered for this thinking and the interventions
proposed varied.
A number of the interviewees noted that issues of money and assets easily cal-
culable in terms of monetary value very often manifest as the substitute-question. It
was suggested that the ease of calculation of their value was the cause thereof.
Several interviewees opined that in many circumstances it may be that a nar-
row focus on a particular issue appears irrational, a person’s circumstances may
mean that a substitute-question chosen to govern their choice-making really does
represent the determinative question of a person’s utility. In such cases this mode
of thinking is not irrational at all. When discussing possible responses to such be-
haviour, one must therefore consider this possibility and explore the reasons behind
the desire with an open mind.
Though the recognition of the narrowing effect was very strong and the sug-
gested responses easily related, the distortion effect was less explicitly identified
and addressed.
Recommended Interventions and Analysis
All of the interviewees suggested a strategy broadly structured around the traditional-
model described above, each interviewee stating that the key intervention is to get
the party to broaden their focus to include a consideration of the full range of po-
tential outcomes and the interests underpinning them. Put differently, the intervie-
wees were seeking ways of ensuring that the parties came closer to satisfying the
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“completeness” axiom by ensuring that they were able to fully comprehend their
preferences and make decisions accordingly. Reducing the distortionary impact of
success or failure on the ‘substitute question’ could also ensure a greater degree of
continuity in their preferences in that an offer’s value would not shift so dramatically
with reference only to that determinative question. Both of these goals would render
the mediation more predictable and ease the process of negotiation and concession-
trading.
The methods suggested for doing so were varied and insightful. Each intervie-
wee emphasised that the mediator should unpack the interests underpinning the
substitute-question and then brainstorm towards alternate means of satisyfying that
interest.
It was suggested that the narrow focus can be caused by a simple lack of prepa-
ration and planning by the negotiator, causing them to focus merely on easily quan-
tifable price or another simple variable as a determinant issue because are not ready
to consider the full range of potential interests and outcomes affected.
To address this, two interviewees recommended prescribing “homework”, where
negotiators are required to identify and assign value to the various elements of a
settlement-proposal. This would force them to do the work necessary to fully con-
sider the various issues. Examples of this could be to request that numerical values
be attached to the various assets under discussion or that a range of outcomes be
generated and then sorted into an order of preference.
Such a process could also generate problem-solving momentum by encouraging
the party to view the process as a flexible one in which many varied permutations
of outcom exist. Acknowledging the prospect of varied settlements along multiple
planes of negotiation could loosen the person’s fixation on the determinative issue
and allow the substitute question to take on a more appropriate valuation.
Another common proposal aimed at promoting this momentum was to request
whatever the determinative issue is, it temporarily be ignored. This means that the
parties are asked to discuss the settlement proposal ignoring the determinative issue.
Thus, if one party were stuck on the issue of maintenance in a divorce settlement, the
discussion could instead be diverted to the division of the other assets. If progress
can be made on the ancillary issues, that momentum can be hoped to assist in re-
spect of the central ‘substitute’ issue. Note though that it would be very important
to ensure that the parties are reminded that that determinative issue has not been
abandoned. They must be assured that they remain in charge of the negotiation and
that that issue will be re-examined in due course.
Another common strain to the interviewees’ recommendations was to empha-
sise the importance of the negotiator’s emotional well-being. Some stated that the
uncertainty and insecurity underpinning a mediated negotiation, particularly in a
divorce-context, often caused this narrow focus. In order to ease this anxiety the
interviewees consistentl emphasising ensuring that negotiators in this situation are
made to feel comfortable.
A unanimous recommendation was for the mediator to ensure that the negotiator
is given the space to communicate their desires on that particular issue, in a manner
in which they feel that their concerns are being heard, understood and accommo-
dated and that they will thereby be made to feel that the negotiation on the other
elements of the settlement will not be conducted at the expense of their interests on
the one issue.
Another recommendation raised here and throughout the interviews was to en-
sure that the parties feel that they are driving the negotiation and deciding what
their preferences are and how they are communicated. To this end, the interviewees
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emphasised the importance of not directly telling the parties to consider other is-
sues or to think in a certain way but instead, the mediator should encourage them
to consider these issues by asking questions to lead the negotiators to flesh out their
own thinking. Again, creating a trusting relationship was emphasised as necessary
to facilitate this thinking.
In sum, the proposed strategies largely followed the standard mediation-approach
aiming to encourage proper evaluation of negotiators’ true interests, the options ca-
pable of satisfying those those interests and consequently informed decision-making.
Though this strategy is by no means novel,+‘ the specific interventions proposed
suggest that the interviewees’ experience has created an awareness of this behaviour
and necessitated strategic responses aimed atassisting negotiators to approximate
rational decision-making.
In addressesing a shortfall in decision-making ability and encouraging more ef-
ficient self-assesssment of interests and decision-making , the techniques remain
within the bounds of appropriate-intervention established above. The interviewees’
emphasis on subtly masking their own impact by encouraging negotiators’ indepen-
dent adjustment of their thinking illustrates an appropriate sensitivity to the impor-
tance of retaining neutrality.
Though these techniques primarily address the narrowing-effect, they woul as-
sist in ameliorating the distortionary-effect somewhat by creating a fuller under-
standing of the value of the total proposal, enabling a more certain and less distorted
comparison with the comparator outcome.
3.3 The Endowment Effect
3.3.1 What is the Endowment Effect?
A number of theorists have posited and successfully tested the theory that economic-
actors overvalue those things which they already own. This means that they grant
greater weight to items they are being asked to sacrifice up than they would when
gaining the same item. They therefore request more compensation for giving some-
thing up than they would pay to gain the same item. Various terms are used to de-
note this theory, including; Endowment-Theory, Loss-Aversion and Divestiture-Aversion11.
Morewedge and Giblin’s study12 provides a simple illustration of this concept.
Group A was given a coffee-mug and the option to trade it for a large chocolate-bar.
Group B was given the chocolate and the option to trade for the mug. Starting with
nothing, group C could choose between the mug and the chocolate.
56% of group C chose the mug while 44% chose the chocolate. This figure can
be taken to represent a reasonably accurate estimation of the spread of preferences
between the two items. Rational behavioural theories would predict that absent
transactional-costs, members of groups A and B would choose the mug or chocolate
in roughly the same ratio13. In fact, 89% of group A chose to keep the mug while
89% of group B kept their chocolate bar.
11Peter Y Wolfe. “How a mediator enhances the negotiation process”. In: N. H. Bus. J. 46 (2005),
p. 38; Cyril Chern. The Commercial Mediator’s Handbook. CRC Press, 2014.
12Carey K Morewedge and Colleen E Giblin. “Explanations of the endowment effect: an integrative
review”. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 19.6 (2015), pp. 339–348.
13Ronald H Coase. “The Problem of Social Cost”. In: Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960).
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Analogous results were found in a study performed by Mnookin14 wherein test-
subjects were asked to sacrifice goods not yet owned but expected meaning that
negotiators expecting to receive a particular item, similarly overvalue those expected
items.
This effect can be observed in negotiations around ‘standard’ contractual-terms
or practices. Where a particular element of a negotiation attracts a standard treat-
ment, this standard amounts to an expected benefit and offers falling short of that
benchmark will generally be disproportionately undervalued15.
Note that this deviation will often operate in a similar manner to the narrowing
comparison bias described above. For example, where a person is aware of someone
else having received a particular outcome in similar circumstances, this result may
become an expected result and any loss relative thereto will be subject to the same
exaggeration of utility-loss.
This theory is not only useful when comparing losses to gains but also in as-
sessing the utility expectations relating to differing losses particularly when their
associated gains are considered. Kahnemann and Tversky16 note this effect, finding
that utility expectations will vary more greatly between losses and losses than be-
tween gains and gains. Thus, the difference between a proposed salary of R40,000
and R45,000 will be more keenly felt by a person who earns R50,000 than by someone
who earns R35,000.
It is also interesting to note the correlation between this mode of thinking and
both the South African law of delict17 and the American law of tort18. In both sys-
tems courts are reluctant to compensate for lost-gains as opposed to compensating
losses. In the South African context, losses in respect of expected future earnings
have only recently been compensated by South African courts through delict and
even then with a large degree of caution.
Korobkin19 posits a cause for this bias, suggesting that decision-makers’ fear of
experiencing regret through actively making a choice rather than receiving ‘stan-
dard’ treatment or maintaining the status quo may motivate this bias. He notes that
it appears that this preference evaporates where there is no uncertainty as to the
future consequences of having to make choices, i.e. where the full results of the
alternative proposal are clear to the decision-maker.
Kahnemann and Tversky20 make another interesting point for our purposes, stat-
ing that the greater impact of losses on expected-utility relative to restrictions on
expected-gains affect the victims’ view of the morality of the person causing this to
occur.The same is true in respect of justifying other’s actions. Actions which cause
losses rather than restrict gains are seen as morally more significant. Thus if someone
inflicts to protect their existing assets, they are viewed as less morally culpable than
someone doing so solely to extend their expected gains. A common example would
be where consumers or employees are more prepared to accept losses imposed by a
company avoiding financial-losses than they would be where the company does so
to expand profits.
14Robert H Mnookin. “Why negotiations fail: An exploration of barriers to the resolution of conflict”.
In: Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 8 (1992), p. 235.
15Russell Korobkin. “Status quo bias and contract default rules”. In: Cornell L. Rev. 83 (1997), p. 608.
16Kahneman and Tversky, “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”.
17See for example the discussion in Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure
Development, Gauteng (CCT 185/13) [2014] ZACC 28
18Kahneman and Tversky, “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”.
19Russell Korobkin. “Inertia and preference in contract negotiation: The psychological power of
default rules and form terms”. In: Vand. L. Rev. 51 (1998), p. 1583.
20Kahneman and Tversky, “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”.
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s discussed in more detail below, a negotiator’s view of the moral-worth of their
counterpart will colour their views of any offers made by that party and their like-
lihood of settling rather than seeking retribution. Again, this is discussed in more
detail below but it serves to note the potential for the effects to exacerbate one an-
other. This combination of forces is referred to as enhanced-loss-aversion21 and can
further inhibit concession-making.
3.3.2 Nature of the Deviation
Again, this bias violates the independence-axiom. Whether or not an item is already
owned by a person should be irrelevant to its value to that person since the relevant
concern is the ultimate distribution of rights and interests at the conclusion of the
negotiation. By introducing an irrelevant consideration as a determinant of the ex-
pected utility of an item, the transitivity and continuity of a person’s preferences are
also inhibited. In fact, the analysis or prediction of preferences becomes impossible
when factors extrinsic to an item affect a person’s valuation thereof. In some cases,
sentimentality or comfort with the status quo may operate as rational benefits to re-
taining things as they are. Nonetheless this will often not be the case and negotiators
and mediators should be cognizant of the operation of this deviation.
3.3.3 Effect on Mediation
The mug-and-chocolate experiment succinctly illustrates the effect22. Simply put,
fewer transactions take place because negotiators are less willing to make conces-
sions than their preferences, absent this deviation, suggests they should. In more
detail, the effect is that parties will fixate on a particular element of a dispute and are
therefore inflexible. This is particularly problematic in cases where items had previ-
ously been shared, for example in a marriage or business partnership context. Each
party overvalues the loss of one particular item and therefore overlook alternative
potential settlement options.
Mnookin notes that this distorted weighting of preferences can cause parties to
risk greater losses in the interest of avoiding certain losses. This is particularly rele-
vant in the mediation-context as parties will, in the same manner, reject the ‘certain’
losses imposed by a settlement agreement in favour of embracing the risk of far
greater loss in pursuing litigation. This difficulty in the context of pre-trial media-
tion is exacerbated by what Finch23 describes as the sunk-costs of litigation where
a participant who has already accrued legal costs in instructing attorneys and com-
mencing pleadings will overvalue the utility loss of sacrificing those ‘sunk costs’
even in the face of likely larger future costs. action, would not be fully compensated.
Kahnemann and Tversky24 make another observation which may hint at an ef-
fective means of managing this issue. They note that the loss-aversion effect is felt
far less significantly in respect of losses of what they call ‘trading goods’meaning
assets such as money or in particular contexts and for particular people with the
relevant knowledge like baseball cards which are generally transactional in nature,
rather than assets which are ‘for use’, like the right of access to a certain property.
The former, it is argued, are more easily placed into a trade-off analysis in that the
negotiator is more used to making an appraisal of the utility of that kind of gain.
21Ibid.
22Mnookin, “Why negotiations fail: An exploration of barriers to the resolution of conflict”, p. 90.
23Dave Finch. Heuristics, Fallacies and Biases. 2008. URL: http://letsinkit.com/?page_id=28.
24Kahneman and Tversky, “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”, p. 9.
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Resorting to standard-terms in contracts can allow negotiating parties to manage
the computational-energy of making decisions with regards settlement and contract
negotiations, allowing parties to focus their discussions on the more complex issues
unique to their situations. Similarly, focussing on the known-quantity of one’s exist-
ing asset-allotment can be easier than making a comparison to an unknown possible
gain. Nonetheless, these benefits should not be overvalued where they inhibit rather
than facilitate effective decision-making.
3.3.4 The Interviews
Here the fictional scenarios described situations where a decision-maker is presented
with settlement-proposals where they are being asked to give-up what they consider
their existing legal rights in exchange for other benefits.
In both cases, the negotiator overvalues the cost of sacrificing that right and ap-
pears unwilling or unable to properly consider the benefits conferred by the alternate
offers meaning that they fixate on that right and do not constructively engage in the
negotiation.
The commercial-scenario describes the owner of a large retailer who owns the
exclusive-rights to trade in certain goods within a shopping-centre. The centre’s
management lets a portion of its premises to a company wishing to trade in those
goods. Instead of engaging with the centre’s management, who appear open to con-
structive and beneficial solutions, the owner is not prepared to give up his exclusive-
trade rights ignoring potential benefits as a result.
The divorce-scenario describes a spouse whose recently-divorced receives monthly
maintenance. The spouse therefore expects that they are entitled to spousal main-
tenance. When confronted with an offer which does not include such maintenance
but which compensates for this by including a generous distribution of the couples’
assets, the decision-maker was neither prepared nor able to consider the full impli-
cations of the offer, rejecting it because of the lack of monthly maintenance. They
experienced the denial of what they believed was a legal right as a loss of that right
and overvalued that loss in terms of their overall estimation of the offer.
After being given time to consider these factual scenarios, the interviewees were
asked whether they recognise this difficulty in practice and then if so, what their
recommended responses were
Recognition from Practice
Again, the interviewees were all very familiar with this form of behaviour, noting
the difficulty negotiators often feel when asked to give up a right or asset, even
where that right or asset is merely an expected right or where the expected gain
associated with doing so clearly justifies the sacrifice. This theory resonated particu-
larly strongly within the divorce-context, where a number of anecdotal stories were
presented to support this conclusion.
Recommended Interventions and Analysis
As we are again dealing with negotiators focusing too narrowly on a particular ele-
ment of a dispute, it is unsurprising that many of the strategies referred to in relation
to the substitute-question effect above were also put forward here. In both contexts,
the aim of these methods is to encourage the parties to view their dispute with a
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wider lens, fully considering all relevant elements of the negotiation, again bringing
that person to axiomatic rational behaviour in similar ways.
Briefly, these observations and recommendations included emphasising negotia-
tors’ need to spend more time appraising their interests, noting the value of problem-
solving momentum, the option of ‘parking’ the key issue to pursue other issues and
the crucial importance of creating an environment in which the negotiator feels se-
cure to discuss their interests openly and make decisions based on that information.
All of these interventions were recommended with the proviso that the negotiators
retain their feeling of control over the mediation.
In addition to the ordinary benefits of a broad analysis of one’s situation, it is
submitted that doing so allows parties the confidence in their decisions, alleviating
the fear of negatively influencing their own outcomes through their own actions,
encouraging them to take the positive step of offering a concession, addressing Kah-
nemann and Tversky’s concerns discussed above
In addition to these repeated-strategies, further insights arose. The first relates
to cases where a negotiator believes they have a legal right and the sacrifice of that
right carries the same feeling of loss. Here, the legitimacy of the right should, where
it is actually dubious, be challenged. The appropriate methods for doing so are
discussed in greater detail below but the overlap and potential value of investigating
that belief is worth noting as a strategic-option here. This strategy is aimed less
at approximating rational choices than at improving the beliefs upon which those
choices are made.
Another recommendation raised by all of those interviewed was simply to follow
the traditional strategy described above; uncovering the interests underpinning the
stated desire for the particular item and then brainstorming other potential solutions
for their satisfaction. In most cases this advice is sensible and where it is possible
it should be pursued. However, where the loss-aversion effect is operating to the
extent that it is the heuristic bias underpinning the desire for the particular item,
rather than any actual interest, pursuing the ‘true’ interest motivating the stated
desire for the item may prove fruitless. Still, it is unlikely that a mediator could
recognise that this is occurring without first exploring the motivations behind an
apparently overzealous protection of a particular item.
In many cases an asset or right which may appear of little value might hold
significant value for a negotiator. This value could be sentimental or related to a
particular interest held by that person. The mediator should investigate the interests
underpinning the desire for that item to determine if this is the case. Nonetheless,
the interviewees suggested that it is often not the nature of the item but the fact of
giving it up to which people attach large negative value.
In other cases the bias will act to narrow a participant’s focus at the expense
of their own interests. An interesting option raised by a number of interviewees
relied on the insight that in many cases people want to have their ownership or
legal entitlement to an item vindicated. Thus, to some extent they are motivated
by the desire to be proved correct and to have their rights recognised, considered
and respected. In such cases, a flexible negotiation all legal rights are subject to
concession and trade can frustrate this interest. This is particularly relevant in cases
where a person’s loss is experienced in relation to a legal right to which they feel
they are entitled.
A commonly-mooted solution mooted here was to use adjudication to settle that
narrow issue. The adjudication could be outsourced to a third party, after the issues
for consideration by the adjudicator are narrowed through the mediation process.
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This streamlining process is useful as it can significantly reduce the costs and time
involved in referring the issue for adjudication.
Alternatively the mediator can, with consent of both parties, make a legal finding
on that particular issue. The mediatior should only do so where they have ensured
that the participants understand that this finding only represents an opinion and
neither advice upon which they should solely without further legal assistance nor a
legally binding finding.
In both cases a finding in a negotiator’s favour can further entrench them in that
position. However, it was noted that in many cases merely having the right recog-
nised and confirmed means that the ‘loss’ of that right is more easily accepted when
because the party will feel that they are being compensated for an acknowledged-
right rather than negotiating without that right having been acknowledged as theirs.
More simply put, they will feel as though the negotiation was conducted from a fair
or accurate starting-point.
It was also noted that a simple act of a negotiator acknowledging that their coun-
terpart holds a legal right can serve a similar function. A mediator may therefere
consider proposing that the other negotiator acknowledge this right. An explana-
tion of the other party’s attitude and the potential for thawing of their attitude on
the negotiation may make such a proposition attractive.
The importance of carefully communicating the request for such a loss was raised
by a number of the interviewees. This strategy largely echoes the work done in re-
spect of identifying the importance of framing offers25. The proposed solution was
that instead of simply asking that a particular asset be sacrificed, a total outcome in-
cluding the concessions offered in response is presented. Thus if one is being asked
to give up a motor vehicle in return for an increased monetary settlement, the two
results should always be referred to together. This assists in keeping the gains in
mind. Based on the above-mentioned finding that the Loss-Aversion effect is much
less keenly felt where ‘assets for trade’ are concerned, it is submitted that a combina-
tion of this technique with the work of assigning value to settlement options can be
very helpful making the trade-off calculable as a whole rather than as two separate
gains and losses. Similarly, framing a request for a concession as part of an offer
which is on balance positive can address the enhanced loss-aversion effect referred
to above.
Of course, this method relies on the availability of offered concessions with which
to make the comparison. Hopefully these will reveal themselves through the ordi-
nary process of uncovering interests and brainstorming solutions.
One interviewee suggested that the exaggerated value on a particular item can
actually assist in stimulating settlement. This can happen in one of two ways. On
the one hand, where the other party is motivated to settlement the attachment placed
on a particular item may make them realise that they have to be prepared to accept
losses of their own through concession-making.On the other hand a shrewd negotia-
tor, recognising the importance of the asset to their ‘opponent’ may realise that they
stand to gain significant concessions in return for giving in on that particular issue.
It was suggested that parties’ unfamiliarity with mediation-processes may cause
an anxiety which can underpin the desire to maintain the status-quo. It was argued
that ensuring the parties recognise that their explorations and actions within the me-
diation are non-binding and confidential can reassure them that any exploration of
potential alternatives will not cost them the item to which they are attaching such
25Sanda Kaufman, Michael Elliott, and Deborah Shmueli. Frames, Framing and Reframing. June 2017.
URL: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing (visited on 12/06/2017).
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signifcant value. These considerations inevitably form part of all mediation pro-
cesses but when confronted with a negotiator whose ability to accurately represent
their interests is inhibited by a mistrust of the process, they become particularly im-
portant
An additional suggestion was simply to remind the party of the benefits, within
the negotiation context, of giving for giving’s sake. Obviously a party cannot be
expected to make concessions for altruistic reasons but there are often materially
beneficial reasons to do so. This is particularly so in cases where an ongoing rela-
tionship is expected or desired. There the act of giving up an item or entitlement can
illustrate an intention to make peace and move towards an open and collaborative
mind-set. Once such a signal is sent, it is often the case that the shift is reciprocated
and the tone of the interaction becomes one in which a more productive negotiation
can take place.
In many cases, a negotiator acts on behalf of others. In that event and even where
acting personally, they may require a ‘bridge-to-settlement’ to allow such a conces-
sion. This means that in order to convince a constituency, or even themselves, to
sacrifice an existing entitlement, an action by the other party giving that negotiator
an excuse to make that sacrifice can be helpful.
While these insights undoubtedly provide potential interventions, we should
note ertain limitations on a mediator’s ability to mitigate the deviation’s effect. The
first is simply that, as pointed out by a number of the interviewees, the attachment
will often be deeply rooted in the psychology of the person holding it. In such cases,
the mediator will generally neither be trained nor able to fix whatever the true cause
is, particularly where it is not related to the kinds of considerations described above.
The above concern hints at a consideration we should bear in mind throughout
this paper. This is simply that people react differently in different situations. It is
therefore difficult to prescribe a rigid solution in a given circumstance. It therefore
remains incumbent on the mediator to read their participants and be flexible in re-
sponse.
Nonetheless, it again appears that because these mediators’ experience has en-
couraged the development of some nuanced technique to supplement their general
approach to mediation. Again, it appears that the interviewees were cognisant of
the need to simultaneously address the effect of the deviation and tailor their inter-
ventions to avoid the appearance of bias. Again, the aim is to assist the parties in
most accurately reaching their own conclusions.
It is submitted that the work of the theorists referred to above provides further
opportunity for additional techniques to be developed. Kahnemann and Tversky’s
conclusion that the loss of ‘transferable’ assets does not attract the same feeling of
loss suggests that asking negotiators to ascribe points or monetary value to the assets
they are being asked to discuss would assist them in seeing them for what they are
and valuing them without the distortionary loss-aversion effect.
Given that mediations very often occur as an attempt to avoid litigation or to
curtail that process, Mnookin’s observations on the sunk-costs of litigation acting
are worth noting. Though this concept was not directly discussed through the inter-
views, it is submitted that mediators should directly attempt to address this issue.
Emphasising that the costs of litigation are only likely to increase as the litigation
process continues and using some of the above-named techniques specifically in ref-
erence to the sunk costs could assist in this regard.
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3.4 Overconfidence in Outcomes
3.4.1 What is the Overconfidence in Outcomes Theory?
Economic actors are generally overconfident in their expectation of their gains from
an upcoming transaction. A review by Helweg-Larsen and Shepherd26 concluded
that ‘hundreds’ of studies had confirmed this while Boulle describes this conclusion
as ‘one of the most significant cognitive biases’27.
Here we briefly consider four causes for this overconfidence which have emerged
in various behavioural studies. Two of these are very similar but will be consid-
ered separately as there is a subtle distinction between them. We must discuss these
causes as they will may point towards solutions for their common outcome.
The first is simply the common tendency to overestimate one’s own abilities and
as a result, one’s own ability to influence the outcome of a negotiation or litigation
in one’s own favour. Studies have confirmed that we very often overestimate our
abilities, particularly in a professional context. Experiments have confirmed that
inter alia college professors28 and taxi drivers29 generally consider themselves better
than the average at their jobs. More apposite for our purposes is the finding that the
same is true of professional negotiators30.
We should note that many negotiators will be represented on mediation by attor-
neys. A number of factors have also been identified as encouraging overconfidence
on the part of the attorney and as a result, the client31. Key amongst them is the im-
perative to maintain a posture of confidence in order to maintain one’s image in the
eyes of both existing and potential clients. Attorneys may also be prone to posturing
as a negotiating tactic. Kahnemann and Tversky note that in many circumstances,
such overconfidence may actually be necessary to sustain negotiators in their efforts
to pursue a fight32.
The second is the well-known confirmation-bias; the tendency to pursue and re-
call information which confirms existing beliefs and to interpret and analyse that
information in a manner supporting those beliefs. Thus, people view factual and
legal scenarios largely from their own point of view and overestimate the strength
of their position.
Another is the subtly different theory of availability-bias33 wherein people over-
emphasise and over-value that information which is readily available to them. The
other party does similarly with their own information. This disjuncture informs
their differing views on a particular matter. Each side therefore emphasises the evi-
dence or information which supports their original view and re-enforces their own
views and discounts those of others. The effect is very similar to that of the ordinary
26Marie Helweg-Larsen and James A Shepperd. “Do moderators of the optimistic bias affect per-
sonal or target risk estimates? A review of the literature”. In: Personality and Social Psychology Review
5.1 (2001), pp. 74–95, p. 74.
27Boulle, “Predictable irrationality in mediation: Insights from behavioural economics”, p. 9.
28Ola Svenson. “Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers?” In: Acta psychologica
47.2 (1981), pp. 143–148, p. 146.
29James R Dalziel and RF Soames Job. “Motor vehicle accidents, fatigue and optimism bias in taxi
drivers”. In: Accident Analysis & Prevention 29.4 (1997), pp. 489–494, p. 491.
30Roderick M Kramer, Elizabeth Newton, and Pamela L Pommerenke. “Self-enhancement biases
and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood”. In: Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 56.1 (1993), pp. 110–133.
31Lyle A Brenner, Derek J Koehler, and Amos Tversky. “On the evaluation of one-sided evidence”.
In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 9.1 (1996), pp. 59–70.
32Kahneman and Tversky, “Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective”, p. 750.
33Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases”, pp. 207-232.
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confirmation bias but the difference is that the latter refers to the evidence on which
conclusions are based while the former refers to evidence being sought to justify
existing conclusions.
A fourth cause is again similar but should be distinguished from the ordinary
conceptions of the confirmation and availability biases. Here we are referring to the
well-documented tendency to pursue, recall, interpret and analyse information in
a manner which suits one’s own desired outcome. The point is subtly different in
that it refers to information which suits one’s desires rather than one’s beliefs. A
famous experiment34 involving the familiar spectacle of sports fans and officialdom
illustrates this point quite clearly by recording the results of asking students of Dart-
mouth and Princeton to view a tape of a Football match between their Universities.
The game had led to accusations that Dartmouth had cheated throughout the game.
The study’s participants were asked to note the number of fouls committed by each
side. Princeton students concluded that Dartmouth had committed more than dou-
ble the amount of fouls as had Princeton whereas Dartmouth students concluded
that the two teams had committed a roughly equal amount of fouls. Similar ex-
periments have been conducted in the litigation context and have shown that even
without a pre-existing allegiance, parties will better recall facts which align with
their desires than those which do not35.
The last three of these causes therefore all refer to our brains’ tendency to recall,
process and evaluate information in an inaccurate and solipsistic manner. Where
both or all parties to a negotiation are similarly affected, the possibility of a shared
understanding of the facts and motivations underpinning the conflict is further lim-
ited.
3.4.2 Violations of the Axioms
Where an economic actor is overestimating their chances of success they are not
violating the rationality axioms. They may be acting entirely rationally based on
their beliefs about the parameters informing their choices. Thus, if an overconfi-
dent claimant believes that they have a 90% chance of succeeding through litigation,
settlement for 50% of their claim would not be a utility-maximising choice36. If, in
reality, their chances of success accurately considers the true facts framing the deci-
sion.
3.4.3 Effect on Mediation
Taken together, these causes lead negotiators to overestimate the strength of their
bargaining position and their likelihood of success. Settlement requires consensus
between the negotiating parties. To reach the Zone of Possible Agreement (‘ZOPA’)37,
34Albert H Hastorf and Hadley Cantril. “They saw a game; a case study.” In: The Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology 49.1 (1954), p. 129.
35See George Loewenstein et al. “Self-serving assessments of fairness and pretrial bargaining”. In:
The Journal of Legal Studies 22.1 (1993), pp. 135–159, where participants in the experiment were assigned
the role of either Plaintiff or Defendant in a matter and then given identical facts, when asked to re-
call these facts the participants overwhelmingly recalled more facts which suited their case than those
which did not. A similar result was found in the context of collective bargaining, see Leigh Thomp-
son and George Loewenstein. “Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict”. In:
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51.2 (1992), pp. 176–197
36Ignoring the costs of pursuing an adjudicated award and
37Negotiation Experts, The Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).
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the outcomes being proposed must be prefereable to all party’s respective BAT-
NAs38, generally their expectation of the result of litigation.
Where parties in competitive negotiations overestimate their prospects of suc-
cess in litigation or indeed within the negotiation itself and underestimate their op-
ponent’s strengths and arguments as a result of these biases, the ZOPA necessarily
shrinks and will sometimes disappear as a result. This will often mean that parties,
who should, properly estimating their prospects of success be able to reach an agree-
ment, fail to do so. Birke summarises this effect as creating higher reservation prices,
fewer concessions and therefore fewer deals39.
A further result of specifically the latter three ‘causes’ is that the participants are
inhibited from empathising with their opponents. This inhibits their ability to en-
gage in constructive negotiation wherein the parties rigorously and empathetically
consider the underlying interests and desires of their negotiating counterparts in
pursuit of mutually-beneficial solutions to their conflict. Where they are focussed
on the strengths of their own position and the facts and considerations underpin-
ning that position, they are unlikely to be able to do similarly in respect of their
counterparts.
Again, the result of this cognitive-error is not that parties have the wrong pref-
erences but that they are unrealistic in their expectations of how these preferences
are likely to be satisfied. In the pursuit of unrealistic expectations, participants will
turn down proposals they should be accepting and can end up suffering as a result.
The pursuit of consensus suffers as a result and inhibits the parties from maximising
their utility in the resolution of the dispute.
We should caution to note that a mediator may often struggle to identify where
a party is overestimating their strengths. These effects at times prohibit negotiators
from themselves understanding and therefore communicating the full reality of their
situation to the mediator. In other cases they may deliberately restrict their com-
munication in this manner because they may think that they need to convince the
mediator that their positions and tactics are reasonable and will therefore overstate
the strength of their bargaining position by revealing only the information which as-
sists in their arguments. Mediators will often therefore be indirectly limited in their
ability to appraise the true merits of the negotiators’ claims.
3.4.4 The Interviews
Here the interview scenarios described situations where a conflict has arisen and one
or both of the parties overestimate the strength of their legal position and as a result
are not prepared to negotiate because they believe that a litigious outcome would be
more rewarding than any outcome which could result.
The overestimation of the likely outcome of litigation, which in these cases rep-
resents their BATNA has two elements. The first is simply that it means that they
are certain or at least overconfident that they will succeed by either vindicating their
total claim or by defending their opponent’s claim entirely. The second factor, which
reflects less of an overconfidence than perhaps a lack of knowledge and experience
relates to the underestimation of the costs of engaging in litigation, be they financial,
emotional or energy-resources.
38Benjamin, The Natural History of Negotiation Mediation: The Evolution of Negotiative Behaviours, Ritu-
als, and Approaches.
39Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”.
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The commercial scenario involved a print-maker and gallerist in a dispute be-
cause a delivery had gone wrong and a number of valuable prints had been dam-
aged. They disagreed over how a court would apportion blame for the resulting
contractual breach with each side believing their case risk-free. This view was rein-
forced by the attorneys representing each party.
The divorce scenario involved two parties preparing to divorce with very differ-
ent views on the likelihood of a court-order ordering a redistribution of the marital
assets. The law, applied to these facts, was unclear but both sides believed that they
would win any legal dispute on this point. This meant that any negotiated outcome
would result in an outcome falling short of the total victory each predicted as the
outcome of litigation and would refuse to enter into such a negotiation.
The interviews aimed at determining whether the mediators recognised this be-
haviour as a common element of legal negotiation then interrogated the mediators’
views on the influence of attorneys in shaping their clients’ views of the likely out-
come of their dispute.
The major focus was placed on uncovering the mediators’ recommended re-
sponses to this overconfidence. Since this would require an interrogation of the ne-
gotiators’ views and pose the risk of creating an appearance of favouring one party’s
views to another, a crucial element of this discussion was the determination of ap-
propriate limits to a mediator’s intervention in this context.
3.4.5 Results
Recognition from Practice
Again, the suggestion that negotiators and their attorneys regularly overestimate
their chances of success was met with unanimous agreement through the interview
process and was repeatedly lamented as a major disrupter of negotiations where set-
tlement is desirable and should be achievable. Although the general habit of over-
confidence was unanimously recognised, the interviewees’ views on the impact of
attorneys on their clients’ outlook was more varied. Given the regularity with which
the interviewees are confronted with this behaviour, it is unsurprising that a broad
range of strategies emerged from the discussions.
Recommended Interventions and Analysis
Again, and as expected, the importance of ascertaining the parties’ true interests and
brainstorming routes to satisfy them was emphasised throughout the interviews. It
was specifically noted by two interviewees that where parties are convinced that
they would win litigation, their thinking on settlement-outcomes is very narrowly
focussed on monetary figures, echoing the manner in which litigation is generally
settled. To address this, the availability and variety of non-monetary outcomes
has to be emphasised. Reminding the parties that negotiation can create a settle-
ment along varied axes, involving any number of assets, rights and responsibilities
rather than just varying a monetary lump-sum settlement can assist in convincing
them that a settlement package can be even more beneficial than a complete success
through litigation. This can dislodge some of the resistance to negotiation which
such confidence can cause.
Understandably however, given that we are here trying to counter the inhibiting
effects of the negotiators’ unrealistic beliefs, the strategies proposed largely focussed
on ‘reality-testing’. A broad outline of this concept has have already been given
above but a fuller discussion of these strategies is warranted here. In sum, the aim is
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to confront the participant to confront and carefully consider all the information in-
fluencing their chances of success and to recalibrate their expectations accordingly.
This is entirely sensible, given that the biases leading to this overconfidence gen-
erally involve a failure or inability to properly confront and digest the information
shaping their prospects.
A common note made during the interviews was the importance of questioning
this confidence sensitively. It was noted that in almost all of the interviews that
a direct challenge to a person’s views can cause discomfort, mistrust and even an
appearance of bias, all of which threaten the mediator-negotiator relationship.
One non-threatening manner of beginning this discussion suggested was to en-
courage consideration of those risks and costs which are independent of the strength
of a person’s case or their ability to argue that case. Confronting litigation’s likely
costs in non-recoverable fees, court delays, working-hours and emotional energy
and ,where relevant, the threats posed to the future relationship between the dis-
putants or to the person or firm’s reputation were all suggested as means of opening
the debate into the wisdom of pursuing a litigious course.
When doing so it is important to highlight that these costs are not the fault of any
of the parties but an inherent element of litigation. Again, these discussions should
be framed in an inquisitive rather than instructional tone. Note again that these tech-
niques will likely be of equal use where a person’s anger is inhibiting the ‘rational’
pursuit of their interests. Finally it should always be pointed out to a negotiator that
regardless of one’s views of the strength of one’s case, litigation is never certain and
outcomes can rely on factors outside of the control of the parties and independent of
the veracity of their claims or strength of their legal arguments.
Of course, these techniques do not address the heart of the overconfidence issue,
being the negotiators’ overestimation of the strength of their case. When addressing
this issue, the importance of the manner in which the investigation is conducted was
highlighted. Mindful of the risk of alienating the negotiator a common theme to the
proposals was that the mediator should distance themselves from this discussion
by ensuring that the challenges to that confidence come from others, either from
third parties or the other negotiators. In cases where parties are very confident or
even where they are posturing to that effect, their show of confidence can be used
to convince them to engage with these issues. Essentially, the mediator can argue
that such a process can only confirm the strength of their position and their relative
bargaining power.
One suggested method of achieving this was to propose that the matter be re-
ferred to a third-party with expert knowledge in the relevant field. This can take the
form of a legal opinion from an experienced attorney or advocate. The incumbent
preparatory work of having to fully confront the available information and commu-
nicate one’s version to such a critical and independent observer can challenge some
of the assumptions and beliefs underpinning this overconfidence. It was hoped that
because the parties would have to pay for this opinion, they would be motivated to
engage with this process more thoroughly than they may have previously. Alterna-
tively a similar ‘narrow’ arbitration process to that described in more detail in the
social-preference theory discussion below was suggested as a means of achieving
the same outcome.
Of course, both techniques run the risk of the third-party’s findings confirming
the views of the participant and thereby entrenching them further in the belief that
litigation will mean total-victory and that any settlement short of or different to that
outcome is unacceptable. In many cases such findings may indicate that the beliefs
were correctly held, in which case the other party themselves may benefit from a
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dose of reality and be encouraged to seek an alternative outcome to litigation when
they recognise that they are facing a costly, drawn out and likely ultimately unsuc-
cessful process. This may encourage them to make the concessions necessary to
achieve settlement.
In other cases, confirmation of the strength of one’s legal position and the knowl-
edge that the mediation process has considered the strength of one’s case may enable
a party to consider more flexible outcomes, safe in the knowledge that their position
of legal strength has been considered and acknowledged.
The other suggested method of outsourcing the critique of the parties’ cases is
to get them to communicate their views, evidence and information to one another.
The method through which this should occur would depend on the state of the re-
lationship between the two parties and the level of specialised knowledge required
to appraise the matter. Where the parties are represented, a useful tool is to follow
a process similar to the ‘heads-of-argument’ process used in litigation wherein the
attorneys each prepare a skeleton of their argument, incorporating the evidence they
would use to justify their factual claims and exchange them with the other side.
This process forces the parties to confront the information held and valued by
the other side while giving them time the time and to properly digest it. It was sug-
gested that such a process poses the risk of the parties focussing too much on the
legalistic elements of the dispute with the associated risk of entrenching their focus
on their legal positions, at the expense of pursuing a negotiated and flexible settle-
ment. However, it was suggested that one is only likely to resort to such measures
where the parties are already thinking in this manner and one seeks to shift them by
challenging their confidence in their legal position and that in such cases, such a risk
is justifiable. Once the overconfidence in the legal position is addressed, non-legal
outcomes before attractive.
Where this relationship is relatively stable and non-confrontational, it was sug-
gested that a more direct approach can be taken wherein the parties and/or their rep-
resentatives interact directly with one another. A face-to-face interaction can force
the parties to consider each other’s views with more empathy and can also highlight
that the other party also has a degree of confidence in their prospects which in it-
self can motivate a reconsideration of one’s own confidence. Where this method is
used, the importance of ensuring respectful communication is of course paramount.
It was also emphasised that the mediator must ensure that their own responses to
the arguments and statements made remain entirely neutral.
Through the interviews it emerged that the most common method of communi-
cating the views of the parties was to do so indirectly, through the mediator. This
simply means that the mediator extracts the views and arguments of one and then
communicates them to the other. Again, we must reiterate the importance of not
appearing to be critical of the participants’ views. In addition, the importance of
phrasing one’s enquiries sensitively was emphasised, with the suggestion that com-
municating the other party’s views in a manner suggesting the mediator is confident
in their ability to counter those arguments can force a deeper confrontation of the is-
sues without putting the mediator-negotiator relationship at risk.
In cases where the funds or time required for third-party legal advice are not
available or where the relationship between the disputants is such that direct com-
munication between the parties or their representatives is likely to prove counter-
productive, the mediator would have to take a more active role. The manner in
which this is to be done and the extent to which the mediator should be prepared
to be exert their influence in this manner will depend on the relationship with the
participant, their personality and the context in which the communication is made.
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Generally speaking, similar considerations govern the manner in which the me-
diator should challenge these views. Challenges should be made through questions
rather than statements, these questions should be framed in a manner suggesting
confidence in their version and an interrogative mode of questioning should be
avoided. It was suggested that emphasising that the questions used to test a ne-
gotatiator’s views are based on the views of the other party, rather than those of the
mediator can go some way to minimising the confrontational feel of such an investi-
gation. It was also emphasised by a number of interviewees that this process should
never take place in front of the other party but should be done in private sessions.
Where a relationship of trust exists or where the negotiator is experienced and ap-
pears secure in the mediation process, it was suggested that one can be more robust
in highlighting one’s concerns.
The discussion regarding the influence of attorneys on this confidence was in-
structive and varied. In sum the prevailing view was that attorneys themselves are
often subject to the same miscalculations as their clients but that given their greater
knowledge of the legal process, they are generally not overconfident to quite the
same extent. Their influence can therefore be exploited as a means of managing
their client’s expectations somewhat. It was therefore recommended that in disputes
where participants do not have a grasp of the legal principles relating to the dispute,
recommending that they engage the services of an attorney can clearly help them in
doing so.
One issue which was identified as capable of preventing attorneys from assisting
in this manner is the understandable focus that attorneys place on the formal legal
elements of a dispute. This is understandable given their training, experience and
mandate within the mediation context but the result is that attempts to shift the focus
to settlement outcomes outside of the realm of legal rights and responsibilities can be
stifled. Where this is combined with the participants’ overconfidence in their legal
positions, this focus can make abandoning that thought process even more difficult
than it would be where their clients are less confident.
Given that attorneys are generally trusted allies of their clients, it is important
not to antagonise or threaten them by aggressively challenging their views. For this
reason it was suggested sensibly that where a mediator is discussing the legal issues,
their attention should be placed on and their questions directed at the attorneys,
rather than their clients. Equally, where one is dealing with the non-legal issues, for
example in crafting settlement outcomes, the attention should be shifted to the client
though this shift should be subtle so as not to alienate the attorney. This shift can
be as mild as a shifting of eye-contact to addressing one’s questions directly to the
client or so drastic as, where the client trusts the mediator sufficiently, by requesting
a private session with the client. As ever, the appropriate action will depend on
circumstances and it will be up to the mediator to be flexible in the face of varying
relational dynamics.
This is not to say that the legal issues should be ignored. It was noted that where
parties are being asked to negotiate outside of the ordinary litigious environment,
retaining a constant awareness of the legal issues, even if that awareness is kept in
the background, can reassure them that whatever path the negotiation takes, their
legal rights have not been ignored and remain realisable and that they have little or
nothing to lose from pursuing alternative settlement proposals.
Of course, any success a mediator has in managing the expectations of a negotia-
tor will have to be met with a concomitant willingness on the part of that negotiator
to ‘climb-down’ from the bullish position they had previously been communicat-
ing to the other side. The methods recommended for encouraging this are broadly
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similar to those discussed in more detail below in the context of over-antagonistic
negotiators but the overarching aim is to offer a route to settlement which does not
rely on an admission that one’s case is not as strong as one has previously made out.
Again, the general approach of the interviewed mediators followed a strategy
broadly based on the traditional model of mediation with reality-testing unsurpris-
ingly dominating the discussion. Nonetheless, the interventions proposed went
beyond this model and suggested a willingness to intervene to counter the effects
of this over-confidence. The manner and extent of these interventions were again
shaped by similar considerations driving the other strategies proposed in this paper.
Interventions can be made provided that they maximise the self-determination of
the parties. It should be noted here that the interventions aimed at addressing the
overconfidence aim at adjusting the information upon which the negotiators make
their decisions, rather than by directing them towards a particular decision. This is
sensible as the primary causes of the overconfidence are the failures to properly en-
gage with the full information which should drive the estimation of their prospects
of success. This distinction is important to note as it protects the self-determination
of the party making that decision.
The other key strategic consideration is the need to avoid creating the appearance
of bias or threatening the relationship between the negotiators and the mediator. As
far as possible, information and advice should be communicated to negotiators by
encouraging them to uncover that information themselves. Where this is not possi-
ble, the mediator themselves should, where feasible, still avoid communicating that
information directly. Apart from the now familiar emphasis placed on retaining the
appearance of neutrality, the impact of ego on reality-testing received particular fo-
cus here and further illustrated the risk of over-intervention and the need to manage
the personalities of the negotiators.
3.5 Social Preference Theory and Attribution Bias
3.5.1 What are the Social Preference and Attribution Bias Theories?
For our discussion of this issue, it serves to begin by drawing a distinction between
direct and indirect interests. We will refer to indirect interests as those where one’s
own outcomes are affected. We will refer to indirect interests as those contemplating
the experience or outcome of others. Of course, this distinction is difficult to draw
in certain cases but here we are concerned only with the results of mediation or
negotiation more generally. In that context, a person’s direct interests will be in the
rights and responsibilities that they themselves receive or have imposed on them
while the indirect interests will be those accruing to others, most pertinently in this
case, the person with whom they are negotiating.
Behavioural Economics has established that it is not only our direct interests
which affect our preferences, but also our indirect preferences40. Thus, the outcome
for others affects how we want a dispute settled. Of course, this claim will surprise
no one. In our daily lives we know that this is the case. The absurdity of Amartya
Sen’s description of two strangers meeting in the street provides a particularly strik-
ing illustration of the weaknesses of the assumption of direct self-interest:
"Where is the railway station?" he asks me. "There," I say, pointing at
the post office, "and would you please post this letter for me on the way?"
40Kahneman and Frederick, “Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judg-
ment”, p. 6.
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"Yes," he says, determined to open the envelope and check whether it
contains something valuable41”
A second, similarly observable conclusion has also been well-tested. Our indi-
rect interests in respect of a particular person are significantly dependent on our
view of their moral worth or blameworthiness in a particular context42. In most
circumstance and in the absence of any negative conduct we wish for the best for
one another. Thus we have an indirect interest in the direct interests of others. This
benevolence is not unlimited and will vary with the strength of the relationship un-
der discussion. For reasons which will become or which may already be clear, this
side of the equation is of less importance for our discussion.
In other circumstances, where we feel that someone has acted in a morally sus-
pect or blameworthy manner, particularly to one’s own cost, our indirect interest in
their utility can shift to include a desire that they be punished for that conduct. In
this sense, our indirect interest in a person can run counter to their own direct inter-
ests. In some cases this desire to punish can actually trump our own direct interests
to the extent that we are prepared to sacrifice some of our own direct gains in order
to impair another’s own direct interests.
This conclusion is most regularly tested and proven through Repeat-Shot, Non-
Cooperative games43 wherein participants each sequentially get the opportunity to
essentially determine the outcome for the other party. The results indicate that we
commonly employ a trigger strategy in terms of which the level of cooperation and
benevolence governing the relationship between the players deteriorates as soon as
one party causes harm to another by deviating from the most mutually beneficial
strategies44. Again, this conclusion is not in any way surprising. The impulse to
punish or at least not to protect is commonly observed in response to hurtful or
harmful behaviour.
This contrasts with our approach where such negative conduct has not been
experienced. This is observable from ordinary life but it has also been rigorously
proven through scientific testing. The simplest form of testing for this conclusion
uses Dictator games wherein a participant is simply given the choice as to how to
distribute a finite pool of resources between themselves and another person. The
game is played once so that there are no potential consequences for not distributing
the resources equally or fairly. A meta-analysis of the results of the large number of
Dictator Games revealed an average distribution of 28.35%. Thus although people
are not perfectly egalitarian, they are far more benevolent than the rationality ax-
ioms describe45. Remembering that there are no consequences for failing to share,
this certainly indicates that we do not generally allow our ‘direct’ interests to simply
dictate our actions; we do consider the outcomes affecting others46.
None of these conclusions are controversial or surprising. A more interesting
conclusion emerges when our ability to attribute blame fairly and accurately has
41Amartya K Sen. “Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory”. In:
Philosophy & Public Affairs (1977), pp. 317–344, p. 332.
42Keith G Allred et al. “The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance”. In:
Organizational behavior and human decision processes 70.3 (1997), pp. 175–187.
43Gintis, The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences, p. 56.
44James W Friedman. “A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames”. In: The Review of Economic
Studies 38.1 (1971), pp. 1–12.
45Christoph Engel. “Dictator games: A meta study”. In: Experimental Economics 14.4 (2011), pp. 583–
610, p. 8.
46Oleg Korenok, Edward L Millner, and Laura Razzolini. “Giving, Taking, and Taking Aversion in
Dictator Games”. In: (2014).
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been tested. We commonly overstate the moral blame of others and undervalue
our own culpability in a particular outcome47. Various causes for this analytical
weakness have been tested and established. These justify discussion as they may
offer some insight into appropriate responses to this behaviour.
One element of this is known as ‘Attribution Bias’. Simply put, testing has reg-
ularly shown that we routinely overestimate other parties’ own role in causing neg-
ative outcomes and undervalue and consistently underestimate the situational con-
straints under which they operate. Thus, when a person arrives late for a meeting,
we are disproportionately inclined to attribute personal blame as opposed to consid-
ering the causes for that tardiness which are outside that person’s control. Studies
have concluded that the opposite is also true; we underestimate our own role in
causing harm to others and overstate the significance of the situational constraints
we face48.
Similarly, the naïve-realism theory49 describes the common overestimation of peo-
ples’ own moral beliefs. We generally overestimate our ability to properly evaluate
facts and situations and make correct moral judgements and discount others’ ability
to do similarly. Essentially, most of us feel that we are individually the only people
capable of properly evaluating a situation and its moral impact. This cannot be true
of all of us. Two parties may view a particular situation differently and both will feel
that they are uniquely capable of making the evaluation and therefore correct. When
we believe that we are acting according to our principles and that those principles
are correct, anyone acting in contrast to ourselves is seen as morally unacceptable
and worthy of censure. The same forces will cause the other person to feel the same
way and the parties will be driven further apart as a result.
Birke and Fox50 note a further complicating issue when they argue that the very
moral standards according to which the actions of others are appraised are very of-
ten determined in a manner which can lend itself to increased conflict. They cite a
number of studies confirming that people develop their values in a self-interested
manner in that they identify and emphasise those standards which suit their posi-
tion. Thus, an employer’s executives will likely emphasise meritocracy as a justifica-
tion for wage-inequalities while their employees will likely focus on equality as the
basis of their criticism of the same situation. In sum, the result is that people acting
in contrast to one another in pursuit of their own direct interests are likely to analyse
their own and each other’s behaviour according to standards which cast themselves
in a good-light and by extension, their antagonists in a bad-light.
3.5.2 Nature of the Deviation
On the most unsophisticated reading of the principles of rationality one could argue
that the first three of the above conclusions violates this principle in that a person
concerned only with maximising their own utility by improving their own situation
would have no indirect interests at all.
This is not a useful conclusion since it is clear that we do hold such indirect in-
terests. This is the point of the Amartya Sen set-piece referred to above. The idea
that we, like the two strangers meeting in the street, are permanently focussing only
47Russell Korkobkin. “Psychological impediments to mediation success: Theory and practice”. In:
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 21 (2005), p. 281, pp. 287-289.
48Ibid.
49Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger. “Barriers to conflict resolution”. In: Negotiation Journal 7.4
(1991), pp. 389–404.
50Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”, p. 35.
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on our own outcomes bears no resemblance to reality and creates the absurdity re-
flected in that piece.
As discussed, we have both direct and indirect interests. These are both nonethe-
less interests and therefore a rational person seeks to maximise these outcomes to-
gether. In some cases, it will be rational to sacrifice some direct interests to satisfy
some indirect interests. On this slightly more nuanced interpretation of the self-
interest axiom, it is clear that the desire to punish or protect does not necessarily
violate the axiom.
This is so even where our desires to punish or protect are based on incorrect
information, as we have note that they often are. People will often overestimate
the moral blameworthiness of a person with whom they are negotiating and will
therefore disproportionately favour negative experiences for them. Thus, in a similar
fashion to the overconfidence scenario described above, we may be making rational
choices based on our subjective beliefs but objectively speaking those beliefs are very
often exaggerated and the decisions reached are objectively irrational as a result.
3.5.3 Effect on Mediation
Here we are primarily concerned with cases where blame is exaggerated. The gen-
eral default desire to at least somewhat prefer mutually-beneficial outcomes is very
useful in a Mediation context. Parties who are concerned with satisfying one an-
other’s interests are more likely to offer concessions and demand smaller conces-
sions for them. In this manner, the ZOPA51 of course increases. In addition, parties
who have an interest in mutually-beneficial outcomes will also more motivated and
capable of the empathy necessary to conceptualise mutually beneficial outcomes to
a dispute.
The opposite is true of the case where a party is seeking to punish. Concessions
which may convince the other party to settle will be doubly difficult to make. In
some cases, the negative-utility52 function will operate so strongly that parties may
be prepared to sacrifice their own direct-interests to satisfy their indirect-interest in
punishment. In a mediation-context this may often mean that parties are prepared to
suffer the large and varied costs of litigation. Their desire to see a person identified
as the culprit and ultimately ordered to correct the effects of their conduct would
have a similar effect. If both sides feel this way about the other, this outcome is even
more likely.
3.5.4 The Interviews
The commercial and family scenarios relating to this theory follow the same struc-
ture. In both cases a person presented with a settlement-proposal is motivated at
least partially by a desire to punish the person making said offer. This desire to
punish means that the persons direct interests are not the sole motivator of their de-
cisions and are also being influenced by their indirect desire to punish. In both cases
the anger underpinning the punishment motive appears to some extent unjustified
and based on an incomplete comprehension or analysis of the factors leading to the
outcome with which the person is unhappy.
In the commercial case, a supplier takes a risk on having sufficient stock of print-
ers to facilitate an IT systems’ designers’ plan for a new firm of attorneys’ offices.
51Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”.
52Korenok, Millner, and Razzolini, “Giving, Taking, and Taking Aversion in Dictator Games”, p. 17.
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Ultimately that supplier is unable to supply these printers and the systems’ designer
suffers a loss of business and reputational damages.
The supplier’s conduct caused this issue but a number of facts suggest that the
anger directed towards them should be mitigated somewhat. Despite this, the sys-
tems designer is prepared neither to forgive the supplier nor to consider the reasons
they acted as they did. As a result, the designer is not prepared to work with the
supplier to find a commercially preferable solution to the likely outcome of litiga-
tion. It is clear that there exists room for negotiation wherein such an outcome could
be reached.
The family scenario involves the breakdown of a relationship wherein one spouse’s
behaviour has become very verbally aggressive and communication has shut down
as a result after a number of incidents of public and private conflict. This spouse
communicates to the mediator that this is indeed what has happened but provides
insight into a number of factors which mitigate the moral guilt of their behaviour to
some extent. It appears that the other spouse is not aware of these factors and is not
seeking to understand the behaviour and is focussed on straightforwardly attribut-
ing blame and seeking punishment and is therefore ignoring potential benefits to an
amicable resolution of the divorce.
Here, the interviewees were asked to confirm whether or not this behaviour was
commonly found in practice and then to advise on the interventions they have de-
veloped to address the effects of this anger on negotiators’ ability to pursue their
interests in a utility-maximising manner.
3.5.5 Results
Recognition from Practice
Of the four ‘deviations’ discussed here, the overestimation of others’ guilt and the
associated effects on negotiations was probably the deviation most recognised and
lamented by the interviewed mediators. A number of the mediators, particularly
those whose backgrounds are more centred in psychology than in law, viewed this
manner of thinking as one of the primary justifications for using mediation tech-
niques. They noted the potential for a mediator to create empathy and understand-
ing the parties and that the potential for constructive thinking that this can create
can lead to better dialogue and mutually-beneficial outcomes.
Recommended Interventions
Once again, each of the interviewees recommended the standard techniques aimed
at uncovering interests and brainstorming solutions. These need not be repeated
here. In sum, they are aimed at encouraging the parties to more fully appraise the
options available rather than pursuing the litigious path that their desire for pun-
ishment is driving them towards. Again, the attempt here is to get closer to the
axiomatic ‘completeness’ of preferences.
The second grouping of interventions which were very forcefully emphasised
here were those aimed at reality-testing, wherein the risks and costs of pursuing a
strategy emphasising punishment and total victory are communicated to the per-
son following that strategy. Again, the preference was indicated indirect means of
achieving this goal and encouraging the negotiator to broaden their own perspective
without appearing to undermine or devalue the person’s position or beliefs. Again
the goal here is to encourage a more reasonable expectation of the likely outcomes
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and thereby is less concerned with encouraging rational decision-making as at im-
proving the information upon which decisions are being made. This area of tech-
niques largely echoes those discussed as responses to negotiators’ overconfidence
detailed in the previous subsection (3.4, overconfidence in outcomes).
The potential losses and risks posed by pursuing a vindictive strategy of this sort
have been discussed but we should note the importance of ensuring that the person
is capable of digesting this information and making sensible decisions accordingly.
Again the appropriate limits to which mediators should act to this end are far from
unanimous. At minimum, it was agreed that the mediator’s role includes an attempt
to calm the parties and ensure that they are acting towards their own best interests.
Others went so far as to say that their role simply was to encourage settlement and
that because a vindictive negotiator is not really negotiating at all; getting them to
soften their stance necessarily forms part of this role.
One interviewee suggested a useful framework of analysis in terms of which we
can view the desirable mindset for negotiation. This is described by the Transactional-
Analysts as the adult ego-state53. In very brief terms this refers to engaging the calcu-
lating, calm mind which is capable of digesting information and making outcomes-
based decisions relying on that information, as opposed to emphasising the child
ego-state wherein decisions are made more impulsively and based on emotion which
in this case would be anger. The aim then is to minimise the effect of the person’s
anger in influencing their decisions. This goal has two elements; the first being to
cause a reconsideration of the anger itself and then to minimise the impact of that
anger on that a decision.
In attempting to minimise the anger itself, a number of useful strategies arose.
The first which was unanimously raised was the importance of allowing the person
holding the anger to communicate this anger either to the mediator or to the person
with whom they are negotiating and to ensure that when they do so they feel that
they are being heard with empathy and that their anger is being recognised. The
interviewees were all quick to emphasise how useful this ‘venting’ process can be.
As has been discussed elsewhere in this paper, allowing the parties the time to
consider the implications of their actions and on those of the other party as well as
allowing the natural thawing of emotions can be very useful. For this reason it was
noted that an appropriate break or delay can be helpful to this end. Such delays can
also ensure that the parties are sufficiently motivated by accrued costs and delays
to pursue settlement. Together these factors can cause the parties to appraise the
dispute in a more constructive manner.
Another common thread to the techniques proposed was the importance of en-
couraging a better understanding of the reasons and motives behind the actions of
the other party, the reasons behind their own interpretation of events as well as the
effect of causes outside of the control of the other party.
The techniques proposed by the Narrative-Mediators were raised specifically in
this context as a useful body of tools for doing this. The tenets of this approach are
discussed at the end of Chapter 2 above but we should at this stage acknowledge the
synchronicity between its goals and the desire to address the anger caused by this
deviation. Acknowledging the manner in which differing beliefs and experiences
can shape a person’s understanding of an event can allow people to empathise and
minimise the anger associated with others’ actions.
53For a brief introduction into the concepts underpinning the Transactional Analysts’ model, see
Fanita English. “How Did You Become a Transactional Analyst?” In: Transactional Analysis Journal 35.1
(2005), pp. 78–88. DOI: 10.1177/036215370503500110
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The interviewees varied in their descriptions of the effect that attorneys can have
on their clients in these circumstances. Some were of the view that attorney can
act as effective ‘agents-of-reality’ in that they are aware of the nature and costs of
litigation and can and are indeed required to advise their clients accordingly. The
other positive effect of legal representation is that that attorney can act as a sounding
board for the venting recommended above described above.
In contrast, it was also noted that many attorneys, trained as they are in the
adversarial model of litigation can actually fuel this anger by focussing their views
on the strengths of their client’s case and those facts and that evidence which suits
their own case. Some interviewees even noted that attorneys may, motivated by
the pursuit of the fees guaranteed by protracted litigation, cynically encourage their
client’s anger as a means of preventing a quick settlement. This issue of the impact of
attorneys and the appropriate manner in which mediators should engage with those
attorneys is discussed in more detail in relation to their impact on the overconfidence
of their clients above but we should note the link between the effects that attorneys
can have in respect of both of these deviations.
One of the interviewees highlighted a potential difficulty which bears some con-
sideration. They observed that in many cases participants have trouble withdrawing
from their anger and the actions and communications which resulted therefrom. In
his view the barrier to doing so was simply that it involves an admission of having
thought or acted inappropriately. In such cases, even occasionally where a partic-
ipant has privately acknowledged their regret or increased understanding of the
other person’s actions, they may not be prepared to adjust their communication or
demands in respect of that person.
It was suggested that in such circumstances it is very important for that person
to be given what essentially amounts to an excuse to soften their position. Encour-
aging the other party to make a gesture of contrition or an indication of a desire to
repair the relationship which can include making some concession or display of a
willingness to negotiate can act as this excuse.
In other cases, simply framing the retraction as an act of benevolence or maturity,
either in a private session or in communicating the adjustment to the other party can
act as a catalyst in this manner. Similarly, framing it as a selfless act in which the
interests of their business or family are being pursued at the expense of one’s own
personal desires can amount to a justification which does not impair the pride of the
person changing their attitude.
In some circumstances participants’ anger will render them unreceptive to these
techniques. We must remember that a mediator’s impact will always rely on some
degree of flexibility on the part of the negotiators. In some circumstances, the anger
motivating a negotiator is justified and there is very little one can do to shift it. In
other cases, the personality of the person acting in such a manner is such that these
techniques will not find much purchase. Where this is the case, the Mediation is
unlikely to succeed in any event and at the very least it will be clear to those partici-
pating that a concerted effort has been made to that end.
Here again, the mediators proposed interventions aimed largely at improving
the information upon which the negotiators make their decisions, rather than direct-
ing the negotiators towards any particular decision. By creating the environment
and encouraging the thought processes by which a better understanding of the other
party’s actions can be achieved, the hope is that the parties’ anger can be dissipated
and that the effect of that anger can be limited in terms of its impact on the parties’
decision-making. The emphasis was again placed on interventions which assist the
parties in overcoming the distortionary effects of this thinking on their own accord.
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This is encouraged by assisting them to confront the information underpinning their
beliefs in a more constructive manner. Similarly, the interventions aimed at restrict-
ing the impact of that anger on decision-making also aim at encouraging the par-
ties themselves to come to their own, better calculated, conclusions rather than on




4.1 A Cautionary Note and Room for Optimism
In certain circumstances it may be difficult to identify which of these deviations or
biases is affecting a negotiator’s decision-making. For example a negotiator’s over-
confidence in the strength of their legal position may underpin a belief that they
are entitled to certain legal rights and when they are asked to sacrifice those rights,
the endowment-effect may excessively restrict their willingness to make that conces-
sion. In such a case, either or both of these effects could be operational and it may
be difficult to isolate the individual effects. Numerous other potential combinations
of these effects are also possible.
In addition, the deviations discussed here do not represent an exhaustive list of
the ways in which negotiators regularly deviate from the rational axioms. Other
commonly accepted deviations, for example the anchoring effect1 will also have
similar effects and will in certain cases be difficult to distinguish from the devia-
tions referred to in this paper. As an example, a negotiator’s view of their expected
gain may be affected by their knowledge of an award made in ostensibly similar
circumstances to those facing that negotiator. In such a case, the knowledge of that
award can operate as an anchor against which any offer or demand will be com-
pared and which comparison would result in similar effects to those driving the
Relative-Distortion theory discussed above.
It therefore appears clear that the discussion above and the recommended in-
terventions arising from the interviews cannot be treated as a recipe according to
which mediators can straightforwardly identify behaviours and then formulaically
implement a particular strategy in response thereto.
This was never likely to be achievable and does not render the insights arising
from the interviews unusable. The varying techniques aimed at addressing the devi-
ations largely aim at achieving similar outcomes and follow a similar pattern. They
aim to encourage a full and accurate investigation of the various elements of a con-
flict while fostering a more nuanced and empathetic view of the facts, interests and
potential outcomes underpinning the negotiations. Any intervention which aims at
achieving these goals and does not exceed the bounds of acceptable mediator influ-
ence cannot harm the process.
Mediation is always a flexible process. There is no prescribed reaction to every
action or decision of a negotiator and the mediator must always remain responsive
to the individual characters of those negotiators, their own strengths, weaknesses
and personality and the particular facts underpinning a dispute.
These techniques should therefore be considered options available as supple-
mentary to our existing tools and which a mediator can employ at their discretion
1Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past either/or”, pp. 8-11.
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where it appears that a negotiator’s ability to give effect to their own interests is
being inhibited by one or more of these deviations.
4.2 Conclusion
Historically, economics modelling and prediction has been based on a set of ax-
iomatic conceptions of human behaviour. Together these assumptions make up the
rational model of economic behaviour. Given these assumptions and because those
assumptions do to a large degree approximate decision-making behaviour and are
also to some extent an ideal of such behaviour, it is unsurprising that mediation
techniques have been developed to respond to that expected behaviour. In very ba-
sic terms these techniques aim to uncover what the parties really want, explore the
potential options for settlement and trade concessions until both sides are offered an
acceptable outcome. The expectation is that in providing settlement options which
do satisfy enough of the parties’ interests, settlement can be reached. They therefore
rely on parties knowing their own interests, understanding the parameters of their
dispute and accurately making their choices accordingly.
Behavioural economists have convincingly illustrated a number ways in which
human beings routinely deviate from this expected behaviour. This means that in
reality there is very often a disconnection between a negotiator’s interests and the
decisions they make in pursuit of those interests. The academic literature relating
to mediation and negotiation has not kept pace with the development of these be-
havioural theories. This presents an opportunity to supplement our existing medi-
ation techniques with interventions aimed specifically at responding to these pre-
dicted deviations.
Given that these theories are descriptive of reality, it was hoped and expected
that experienced would recognise these patterns from their practical experience.
Through a series of interviews with mediators of varied backgrounds it was estab-
lished that these theories do indeed describe very common behaviour and that as a
result, the mediators have had to develop techniques to supplement the traditional
techniques referred to above.
This experience provided rich insights into the techniques and strategies one can
use to address these issues and the constraints and considerations shaping the choice
of intervention.
Prior to engaging with the techniques suggested in these interviews, it was im-
portant to establish a framework according to which the proposed interventions
could be evaluated for usefulness and appropriateness. The key issue was to draw
the boundaries of acceptable mediator intervention in terms of how far the mediator
should be willing to influence the proceedings.
The views of the mediators emerging from the interviews, when considered to-
gether with Douglas’ work in establishing the ideal meaning of neutrality in this
context and Birke’s problematizing of the theoretical divide between facilitative and
evaluative mediation were very helpful in establishing a broad ideal of the types
of intervention at which mediators should aim when confronted with this deviant
behaviour. Ultimately this ideal echoes and expands on Ko’s New-Evaluative ap-
proach2.
2Ko, “On the Role of a Mediator: A Behavioural Law and Economics Perspective”; Douglas, “Neu-
trality in mediation: a study of mediator perceptions”; Birke, “Evaluation and facilitation: moving past
either/or”.
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In brief, the interventions should ensure that the mediator both remains neutral
and is seen to be neutral. The mediator should aim to increase the self-determination
of the parties by empowering and encouraging them to maximise their utility based
on their own interests, rather than by imposing their own interests on the outcome
of the negotiation. Interventions are justified where a party’s lack of knowledge, ex-
perience or some other disadvantage creates a power imbalance wherein an absolute
equality of treatment would result in an inequality of outcome.
The type of analytical shortcomings caused by the deviations described here can
be viewed in a similar light. This is particularly so where the weakness inhibits
the potential for settlement and thereby causes the other party to the negotiation to
suffer as a result. Thus, an intervention aimed at addressing one party’s decision-
making shortcomings also assists the other party and therefore does not aid one
party at the expense of the other.
The net effect is to sanction those interventions which aim at encouraging be-
haviour approximating the rationality axioms and thereby reenforcing the effective-
ness of the traditional model of mediation by creating an environment in which the
parties are themselves capable of brainstorming their problems and making deci-
sions which better give effect to their interests.
The interventions therefore appear to remain within the bounds of acceptable
influence prescribed by Susskind and Thaler’s Nudge theory in that they aim to in-
fluence the information upon which the decision is made, by encouraging the parties
to properly evaluate the information available to them. This is as distinguished from
directly influencing them to adopt a particular view or decision3.
The interviewee’s responses were predominantly based in experience, rather
than theory. This is as expected as there remains a dearth of theory prescribing
responses to these behaviours. The interviews nonetheless provided significant in-
sight into these issues.
Although the responses were varied as between the interviewees and in relation
to the particular deviation under discussion certain general principles emerged from
that discussion. Though in some cases the mediators were keen to emphasise their
refusal to impact on the views of the parties, in the interest of remaining and appear-
ing to remain neutral, their proposed responses to the fictional scenarios suggested
that they are in fact prepared to intervene in ways which would affect the views of
the negotiators. Others were prepared to more straightforwardly acknowledge that
their actions routinely have this effect and acknowledge that in certain instances
their interventions are necessary to move the mediation forward in a mutually ben-
eficial manner.
It therefore appears that regardless of their stated intentions mediators do rou-
tinely impact on the ways in which negotiators reach their decisions. What became
clear was that even where this was acknowledged, the extent to which it is accept-
able to do so is circumscribed according to the limitations we have described above.
Ultimately, the mediators’ intention appeared to be to encourage the parties to
bypass the effect of the deviations by allowing them to better process the informa-
tion underpinning the conflict and to make better decisions in pursuit of their own
interests. Although the majority of the interviewees did not refer to academic theory
in describing the mindset which should be encouraged, the Transactional-Analysts’
conception of the Adult-Mode of thinking provides a useful illustration of the type
of thinking which mediators should encourage.
3Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness.
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When doing so, the ultimate aim appeared to be to make the standard medi-
ation tools more effective by encouraging the parties to make decisions in a more
accurate and calculated manner. The techniques emerging from the interviews are
therefore best viewed as supplements to our existing mediation tools, rather than as
replacements.
Although little academic work has been done to directly deal with these deviant
behaviours, the development of the narrative and transformative mediation theo-
ries provide an interesting set of techniques which aim to achieve outcomes which
would undoubtedly assist the parties in overcoming the cognitive-barriers these de-
viant behaviours describe. Though these schools of theory were mentioned during
the interviews and undoubtedly underpin some of the views of the mediators, the
majority of the techniques proposed through the interviews were learned through
experience. Thus, these schools of theory were discussed here largely as an introduc-
tion to a body of work which could provide responses to the challenges proposed
by these deviant behaviours and as a means of further understanding the goals at
which those interventions should be aimed.
The confluence between the suggested interventions and the overarching strat-
egy of Transformative-Mediation, particularly its pursuit of recognition and empowerment-
shifts suggests that a broader investigation of the techniques prescribed there and
their application in respect of these and other deviations may prove fruitful. We
should note however that the interviewees’ suggestions of analogous techniques
were recommended as supplements to our traditional model, rather than provid-
ing an entirely alternative structure, as prescribed by Bush and Folger. A wholesale
adoption of their prescribed techniques would therefore fall outside the experience
and repertoire or most mediators but there are certainly lessons to be learned from it.
In particular, their focus on the manner in which ideas and information are commu-
nicated between was not strongly canvassed by the interviewees but could be very
useful in addressing some of the causes of the deviations referred to here4.
The Narrative-Mediation theories provide a further possible source of interven-
tions which fall within the overarching strategy emerging from the interviews. Many
of the major elements of that theory found representation in the similar strategies
proposed in the interviews. One technique which was not mentioned in the inter-
views was to encourage the parties to reimagine the conflict in terms of a positive
narrative. It is s with the hope that doing so facilitates an improved empathy, under-
standing of the conflict and desire for cooperation which can improve the bargaining
and problem-solving processes involved in our ordinary techniques.
Though room for further investigation and research undoubtedly remains, it is
submitted that the interviews were useful both in prescribing possible techniques
and in describing the characteristics against which mediators should evaluate their
potential interventions where parties’ decision-making behaviour does not match
the rational model.
4Bush and Folger, The promise of mediation: The transformative approach to conflict.
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